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Abstract 
Using empirical analysis, complemented with case studies, this paper studies under which 
circumstances IMF programs manage to catalyze private capital flows into the countries 
concerned. While we found no catalysis in general, the situation differs very much depending 
on the type of capital flow and the program’s objective. On the first, the Fund seems to be 
doing a better job at attracting FDI than shorter-term flows, particularly cross-border bank 
lending. On the second, programs oriented towards crisis prevention or with longer-term 
objectives, also perform better in terms of catalysis. In turn, programs oriented towards crisis 
resolution actually discourage private capital flows. This worrisome finding, given the 
importance of crisis resolution for the Fund, is mitigated for FDI inflows in the case studies 
analysed.  Finally, all case studies point to the role of conditionality –as opposed to signalling 
and liquidity– as the strongest channel through which IMF catalyzes private flows. 
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1 Introduction 
The role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in improving the functioning of the 
International Monetary System is probably one of the most discussed and long-standing 
topics in the realm of International Economics. This includes a large number of aspects, such 
as the success of IMF programs in achieving sustainable growth, its distributional effects, 
the moral hazard consequences of IMF actions and, also, the IMF’s catalytic role in 
attracting capital flows to emerging countries.1 In fact, enhancing countries’ access to 
international capital markets is widely regarded as an important objective of the IMF, even if it 
is not explicitly stated in its Articles of Agreement. 
The notion of the IMF having a catalytic role gradually emerged in the last three 
decades, although it only occupied a prominent position in the policy debate agenda after the 
financial crises of the 1990s.2 The liberalization of the capital account and the surge –and 
increased volatility– in capital flows to emerging countries has been associated with a 
drastic increase in the size and frequency of balance of payment difficulties, which has made 
IMF financing unable to cover, on its own, its members’ financing needs. Moreover, 
large IMF-supported rescue packages have been increasingly criticized on the grounds that 
they induce moral hazard in international financial markets, further stressing the need to 
generate alternative sources of finance. In this context, the IMF role in catalyzing private 
capital became crucial for countries to grow out of their balance of payment difficulties.3 
An assessment of the extent of the Fund’s catalytic role is also instrumental in 
determining the amount of adjustment that a country under an IMF program will need to 
undergo in order to cover its financing gap. In fact, if the program is designed under a very 
optimistic assumption for capital inflows and, thereby, economic growth, its targets will 
probably be too tight, leading to a very costly adjustment. 
Many explanations have been put forward to justify the IMF catalysis of private flows. 
A first one is the liquidity obtained by a country which signs an IMF program. This is the 
most direct channel through which the Fund helps cover a country’s financing needs, thereby 
contributing to the restoration of its external viability and comforting international investors. 
Liquidity should play a key role in crisis resolution programs but it can also be important in 
other types of longer-term arrangements such as the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF) as long as recipient countries face balance of payment difficulties. In turn, the 
potential catalysis of precautionary arrangements cannot be explained by the liquidity channel 
since no disbursements are made, at least at the start of the program. 
A second channel is the policy effect stemming from a program’s conditionality. As 
long as conditionality is correctly designed and carried out by the country’s authorities, it 
should imply better policies and, thereby, higher expected growth. The latter should clearly 
                                                                          
1. While other Multilateral Institutions also lend to countries and, thus, may also have a catalytic role, these generally 
follow IMF decisions as to whether to grant a program. Macroeconomic conditionality is generally delegated to the IMF 
as well. This is why we focus on the IMF. 
2. Cottarelli and Giannini (2002) offer an excellent account of the gradual appearance of the concept in the IMF writings 
since 1977.  
3. The importance of the IMF catalyzing private flows was stressed with the adoption of the Prague Framework for crisis 
resolution in 2000, where it was stated that “the combination of catalytic official finance and policy adjustment should 
allow a country to regain full market access quickly if it faces a liquidity problem.” 
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attract private investors [Guitián (1995) and Dhonte (1997)]. It is important to note that 
conditionality may be associated to a financial disbursement from the part of the Fund but not 
necessarily, as in the case of precautionary programs. 
The positive signalling effect that an IMF program can offer to a country is a third 
channel. This can be related to the conditionality but it can also stem from the IMF’s seal 
of approval of a country’s own policies. The signalling effect is based on the assumption of 
imperfect information in financial markets so that investors profit from the IMF’s acting as 
a “delegated monitor”, mediating between its member states and the market [Tirole (2002)]. 
An important case in which the IMF can signal a country’s credibility is in crisis prevention, 
through a precautionary arrangement. In any event, the move towards more ownership in the 
IMF programs makes the differentiation between conditionality and signalling fuzzier. 
Counterarguments have also been offered as to whether liquidity, conditionality and 
signalling contribute to catalysis. First, as for the liquidity injection, it could be argued that, 
unless the IMF program succeeds in restoring confidence quickly, it might just be offering new 
funds to feed capital flight in the near future. This is in line with the idea that IMF programs 
may actually induce moral hazard in creditors’ behaviour. The problem is that it is quite difficult 
to distinguish between catalysis and moral hazard, particularly in empirical studies since both 
are associated with an increase of capital inflows, at least in the short-term. Second, the 
policy regime shift induced by conditionality usually has a contractionary effect which may 
act as a deterrent for foreign investors. Finally, the Fund’s signalling may sometimes act as a 
wake-up call for investors that a country may be facing problems not foreseen by the 
market. 
Given the above arguments for and against IMF catalysis, it seems appropriate to 
assess the question empirically. Existing studies, reviewed in the next section, find little or 
no evidence of an IMF´s catalytic role. There are, however, a number of considerations to take 
into account. 
First, IMF programs have different objectives, which may affect the extent to which 
they catalyse foreign capital. Two clearly separated ones are crisis prevention and crisis 
resolution. In the former the fall in capital inflows before the Fund intervenes will probably 
be less acute than in the latter and the problem less severe. If we think of the traditional 
model behind the Fund’s action, basically addressing balance of payment needs, one should 
expect a higher IMF impact in crisis resolution. This, however, is not what we find in our 
empirical analysis, which should constitute a warning signal for the Fund’s as a crisis 
manager. Catalysis in crisis prevention –through precautionary programs– is stronger 
although concentrated on FDI. This is also the case of IMF longer-term focused on achieving 
sustainable growth and reducing poverty. 
Second, existing studies do not generally handle the problem of sample selection, 
or they do so in very rough terms. We show evidence in this paper that such problem exists 
since countries engaging in an IMF program tend to be in weaker economic circumstances, 
beyond what we can control for in the regressions. The question is whether taking into 
account such difference helps yield a more optimistic picture of the Fund’s catalytic role. 
Our results show that this is the case only where catalysis could be found before controlling 
for sample selection, namely for precautionary arrangements and longer-term programs and 
especially for FDI. In the same way, controlling for sample selection increases the negate 
impact of crisis resolution-oriented programs, as well as for short term flows in general. 
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Third, the traditional literature on IMF catalysis generally focuses on short term 
private capital inflows, which are no longer the most important for emerging economies. 
FDI has become the main source of financing for many emerging countries and it is also more 
stable. This should raise the interest on the Fund’s role in attracting FDI. Although it is 
true that FDI decisions are generally long-term, this does not mean that an IMF program 
should not affect them. The most obvious channel would be the policy effect of conditionality. 
This influences a country’s medium term growth and, thereby, the expected return for long 
term investment. In addition, we do not want to put too much emphasis on total private 
capital flows –as in other more recent studies– since some of the determinants of FDI, 
portfolio and cross-border flows are different. We, thus, conduct separate analysis for 
each type of capital inflow, with special interest for FDI, which has been the one least 
analyzed in the existing research. 
We use two methodologies, econometric analysis and case studies. These are 
complementary in several ways. First, econometric techniques can help tackle the sample 
selection and counterfactual problem through causal inference. Case studies, in turn, allow 
us to take into account many of the country level specificities lost in the regression 
analysis. Furthermore, case studies allow us to explore which is the channel(s) behind that 
catalysis, namely liquidity, conditionality and/or signalling. 
In sum, with the help of two complementary methodologies, we intend to answer the 
following questions: (i) Do IMF programs help countries attract more private capital flows than 
they would if no program had been signed?; (ii) Does the impact vary for different kinds of 
flows?; (iii) Is the Fund’s catalytic role stronger when preventing or when resolving crisis? 
What about the impact of longer-term structural programs?, and finally, (iv) What are the 
channels through which an IMF program catalyzes flows? 
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2 Existing literature and paper objective 
Although scarce, the existing theoretical literature argues in favour on an IMF’s 
catalytic role [Corsetti et al. (2003)]. The reason behind is that the coordination of agents’ 
expectations –including investors– is facilitated when markets are stabilized through the IMF’s 
provision on liquidity. 
The empirical literature, in turn, hardly finds any evidence of such catalysis, either 
through regression analysis or case studies [such as Killick (1995) and Ghosh et al. (2002)]. 
Table 1 in Appendix 1 summarizes the most relevant contributions. There are, however, 
a number of specific cases in which some catalysis is found depending on (i) the conditions in 
the concerned country; (ii) the kind of capital flows analyzed; (iii) the type of IMF programs; 
(iv) the size of the associated financial assistance, and (v) the relationship between the country 
and the Fund. 
With regard to the conditions in the concerned country, there is a growing 
consensus that IMF programs have stronger catalytic effects in “intermediate” countries, in 
terms of fundamentals [Eichengreen and Mody (2001a)] or when the situation –measured by 
the ratio of reserves to imports or the ratio of debt to GDP– has not deteriorated too much 
[Mody and Saravia (2003)]. For bad performers –probably the most interesting group because 
of their difficult access to foreign investment– Eichengreen and Mody (2001a) show a fall in 
capital flows when engaged in IMF programs and the same is true for Bordo, Mody and 
Oomes, (2004). For good ones, Kletzer and Mody (2005) find that, if they have a low debt 
to GDP ratio, they will access international markets better under an IMF program. Two other 
country-specific factors have been highlighted in the literature: the volatility of the external 
sector, which seems to facilitate catalysis [Mody and Saravia (2003)]4 and market access, 
which appears to discourage it [Benelli (2003)].5 
Various contributions have tested whether the presence of an IMF program has a 
differential effect on the various types of capital inflows without reaching a clear 
consensus. Marchesi (2001) shows that the presence of an IMF program tends to favour 
debt rescheduling. In this context the IMF would function as a “screening device”. For the rest 
of flows, the evidence is mixed. For FDI, Edwards (2003) reports a negative influence of 
IMF programs but Bird and Rowlands (2002) find that certain IMF programs, namely 
Stand-By Arrangements (SBAs) catalyze FDI in middle-income countries. For portfolio flows, 
Edwards (2003) and Bird and Rowlands (2002) report evidence of a reduction of flows in 
countries with an IMF program. As for bond issuance, Edwards (2003) finds no catalytic effect 
while the opposite is true for Eichengreen and Mody (2001b) and Eichengreen, Kletzer and 
Mody (2005). These authors argue that the role of the IMF as a “delegated monitor” is more 
likely to manifest itself in the bond market because, as opposed to banks, bondholders 
are seldom engaged in monitoring activities and can be more influenced by the signalling 
related to the signing of an IMF program. Indeed, Eichengreen and Mody (2001b) and 
Eichengreen, Kletzer and Mody (2005) fail to find a catalytic effect for the specific case of 
bank lending. 
                                                                          
4. They measure the volatility of the external sector with the variance of the growth rate of exports. 
5. He finds that market access tends to increase the shortfall observed between actual capital flows and projected 
capital flows during the implementation of the program. 
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In the same vein, no clear idea exists on what kind of IMF program has a larger 
catalytic role. In general, it would appear that longer-term, concessionary, programs are 
associated with lower volumes of capital inflows, mostly FDI [Eichengreen and Mody (2001b); 
Bird and Rowlands (2002)]. In the same vein, programs with a stronger component 
of structural conditionality appear to have a weaker catalytic effect [Eichengreen and 
Mody (2001b)] than programs with a strong macroeconomic conditionality [Benelli (2003)]. 
In turn, shorter-term programs seem to help attract capital only if certain conditions are 
met. In particular, SBAs appear to catalyze flows in middle income countries while the 
Extended Financial Facility (EFF) does so in low income countries [Bird and Rowlands (2002)]. 
Finally, there is growing –albeit still scarce– evidence that precautionary arrangements tend 
to catalyze private flows [Mody and Saravia (2003); Eichengreen et al. (2004)]. Still, the 
difference in catalysis between crisis prevention and crisis resolution programs has not been 
explored yet. 
Another important issue which has been analyzed is the size of the financial 
assistance associated with the program. For Mody and Saravia (2003), larger programs are 
associated with a stronger catalysis of private flows. In the same vein Eichengreen, Kletzer 
and Mody (2005) find that, for countries facing solvency risk (i. e., with a high debt ratio), it is 
the volume of lending rather than the IMF presence which attracts private capital. The 
opposite seems to be true for countries facing liquidity risk. Killick (1995), however, argues 
that larger lending may just be fuelling future capital outflows, because of moral hazard. 
Institutional constraints within the IMF have been used to justify this viewpoint: upon approval 
of a program with exceptional access, the IMF Staff appears to make more optimistic 
projections of future private flows in order to close the country’s financing gap. This implies an 
overestimation of the IMF’s catalytic impact [Benelli (2003)].6 
Finally, the kind of relationship between the IMF and the concerned country 
has also been explored. A continued presence of the IMF in a country seems to reinforce the 
attraction of capital flows [Mody and Saravia (2003)]. At a certain point in time, however, such 
presence starts to send a negative signal to investors so that it stops catalyzing private flows. 
Case studies, focusing on some qualitative features of the relationship between the IMF and 
the countries under a program conclude that what really matters is the perception of a strong 
commitment to the program [Bird, Mori and Rowlands (2003)]. 
A question that has not been studied much is through which channels the Fund 
influences investors’ behaviour. Benelli (2003) argues that it is the policy adjustment related 
to IMF programs what catalyzes flows. Eichengreen, Kletzer and Mody (2005) report that the 
relative importance of the liquidity-signalling effects varies depending on the level of 
indebtedness of the country concerned. In any event, all these studies are empirical and, 
therefore, face limitations when analyzing the channels. 
In conclusion, the weak evidence in favour of an IMF catalytic role has served the 
critics of the IMF to strengthen their claims about the “ineffectiveness” of the institution: it 
has been argued that the Fund fails to correct informational market failures [Edwards (2003)] 
and that, by overestimating its catalytic role, it introduces excessively contractive policies 
[Bird and Rowlands (2002)]. Given the relevance of the issue for countries with an IMF 
                                                                          
6. Benelli (2003) uses IMF projections as the counterfactual in his study. He interprets that a program has a catalytic 
effect to the extent that actual capital flows reach projected capital flows in the aftermath of the concession of the 
program.  
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program or seeking it, it seems important to build upon the existing research, addressing 
some of its caveats and open issues. 
Probably the biggest caveat of the existing literature is not taking proper account 
of the counterfactual and, thereby, sample selection. This is so because it is likely that 
countries seeking an IMF program are generally those in worse shape and/or with the worst 
starting conditions and that this cannot be fully controlled for. Another important issue is 
acknowledging that the Fund’s different objectives, particularly crisis resolution and crisis 
prevention and that their impact on private flows could be different. The long or short term 
nature of IMF program may also have a bearing on catalysis. 
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3 Methodological issues 
The nature of the question explored in this paper implies a number of challenges which have 
not always been addressed successfully in the existing literature. An important one is the lack 
of a counterfactual. In order to assess whether the adoption of an IMF program leads to an 
improved access to international financial markets, one needs to know what would have 
happened if the program had not existed, but this counterfactual is obviously not observable. 
A related problem is the fact that the counterfactual is not only not observable, but probably 
a non random event. While most studies assume that a country’s signing IMF program is 
random,7 the fact that the IMF generally grants financial assistance only to countries with a 
balance of payment problem can be informative to potential lenders by itself, independently 
on the impact of the IMF program. In other words, it can unveil that the country is not doing 
well or has worse starting conditions beyond what can be observed. This, by itself, should 
make these countries less attractive to private capital flows, not as a consequence of the IMF 
program but of the situation it unveils. As a consequence of this sample selection problem, 
the estimated parameter to account for the IMF’s role in catalyzing capital inflows could be 
biased downwards. 
There have been some attempts to handle non-random sample selection in the 
existing empirical literature. Edwards (2003) applies a two-stage procedure, so that he first 
estimates the likelihood that an IMF program is granted and, then, the determinants of capital 
inflows with IMF programs as objective variable. In reality, this procedure basically helps 
tackle the potential endogeneity that IMF programs are signed because of the evolution of 
capital inflows. Furthermore, the reasons for a country to sign an IMF program are probably 
related to the determinants of capital inflows so that the coefficient of interest may still be 
biased. Mody and Saravia (2003) applied a model á la Heckman to correct for sample 
selection bias when they estimate the effect of an IMF program over the spread charged 
in the issuance of bonds by emerging countries. However, the reason behind is rather 
different: making sure that countries which cannot access bond markets are not included 
in the sample. The variable they use to this end is the ratio of debt service to exports, 
under the relatively unrealistic assumption that it influences the decision to issue a bond but 
not the level of the spread. Benelli (2003), in turn, uses the amount of capital flows 
projected in the IMF program as a measure of the counterfactual. He, then, compares it with 
the capital flows that actually came in after the program was signed. The problem with this 
approach is that IMF capital flow projections tend to be optimistic when the program is being 
designed so that there is no financing gap and the program can be approved by the Board. 
The problem of sample selection has long been identified in other spheres of 
economics (particularly labour and household behaviour) and econometric techniques 
have been developed to tackle the issue. Many of these techniques cannot be applied to our 
case because our data is not obtained from a random experiment so as to have the perfect 
counterfactual. Among the available ones for non-random experiments, matching seems to 
be the preferred one. Hardoy (2002) is probably the first to apply it to a topic related to ours, 
namely the impact of IMF programs on economic growth. Nunn (2005) also employs 
                                                                          
7. One exception in Benelli (2003), who has information on the amount of capital flows projected in the IMF program and 
compares it with the capital flows that actually came in after the program was signed. 
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matching to compare the long term growth of countries with its institutions based on British 
and French common laws. 
Finally, existing case studies on the catalytic role of the IMF have not attempted to 
tackle the sample selection bias. In fact, no full-fledged explanation is given for the country 
choice, nor the counterfactual problem. We try to tackle both problems by comparing pairs of 
countries, one with an IMF program and one without, as close as possible in terms of their 
attractiveness to capital inflows and having experienced similar balance of payment 
difficulties.  
Another important challenge is to differentiate among IMF objectives. In fact, no 
study clearly distinguishes between crisis resolution and crisis prevention. We shall do so both 
in the regression analysis and in the case studies. In the regressions, we take short-term 
programs, as IMF tools for crisis resolution, and see how they perform in attracting different 
types of private capital inflows. In addition, we reduce the sample to countries having 
undergone a crisis, with or without an IMF program, and see whether the degree of catalysis 
is different. For crisis prevention, the only available tool at the Fund’s disposal –after the 
elimination of the credit contingency line– are precautionary arrangements. These are IMF 
programs in which countries accept conditionality voluntarily and have no intention to make 
use of funds when the program is signed (although they have the possibility to do so in the 
course of the program if conditions warrant it). In the case studies, we compare pairs of 
similar countries having undergone a crisis with and without an IMF short-term program and 
countries having been affected by a common external shock, with and without a 
precautionary arrangement, but which have managed to avoid a full-fledged crisis. 
Finally, we also introduce a clear distinction among types of capital inflows, being 
different in nature and even in some of their determinants. While the original literature on the 
IMF catalysis focused on short-term flows, the growing importance of FDI calls our attention 
to such longer-term and more stable flows and the question is whether the Fund can do 
something to attract it. One could think that the policy channel –through complying with the 
program’s conditionality– could be important in attracting FDI.  Finally, we also distinguish 
between countries with market access and without, since the full sample is probably not 
relevant for some types of private flows, particularly portfolio ones. In the case studies, only 
countries with market access are considered. 
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4 Empirical approach to measure the IMF catalysis 
4.1 Variables and data 
The variables of interest in this study are different types of private capital flows, as dependent 
variable, and IMF programs as objective. Private capital flows are divided into FDI, portfolio 
and other flows (mainly bank cross-border lending). We run separate regressions for the 
three of them and also for total private capital flows (variable definitions and data sources can 
be found in Table 1 in Appendix 2). The latter, however, is less relevant for several reasons. 
First, we find very different secular trends for each type of flow with a rapid increase in FDI 
since the beginning of the 1990s and a sharp fall in cross-border banking lending in the 
late 1990s (as shown in Graph 1 below and in the main statistics in Table 3, Appendix 2). 
 
Graph 1: Evolution of different types of private capital flows and number of IMF 
programs 
The graph shows the sum of the different types of capital flows for the 156 countries in our sample. 
 
In fact, there are a number of determinants that are specific to each type of flow, so 
that having a single set of controls for total flows does not allow to take into account their 
specificities. Second, IMF programs could be designed in such a way as to attract certain 
types of flows and even discourage others. We shall see some examples of this in the case 
studies. Third, the relatively small number of observations for portfolio flows, compared with 
FDI and cross-border bank lending restricts the observations available for total private flows 
but also biases the sample towards those countries where data for portfolio flows exist.8 
                                                                          
8. We do not have sufficient information to distinguish between real missing observations and those from countries 
without portfolio flows so we cannot use imputation to increase the number of observations. 
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Our database contains annual data for 156 emerging and developing countries for 
the period 1970 to 2002 (Table 1 in Appendix 2 lists the countries included, and Table 2 in 
Appendix 2 shows the list of variables used). This is the number of countries for which there 
are at least two observations available for at least one of the three types of private capital 
flows. The total sample is composed of 35 Latin American countries, 25 Asian nations, 53 
African ones, 29 European countries and 7 from both the Middle East and Oceania. We, thus, 
have an unbalanced panel with a maximum number of observations of 1850. This is when 
cross-border lending is chosen as dependent variable. In the case of FDI and portfolio flows, 
the number of observations is reduced to 1728 and 928, respectively. For total private capital 
flows, the number is further reduced to 928.9 
The objective variable is a dummy which takes the value of 1 every year the country 
has an IMF program and 0 otherwise. When introducing it in the regression, this dummy is 
taken with one lag so as to allow some time for capital flows to react to the program. In a 
second set of results, we focus on the possible announcement effect of the program, which 
implies that only the year in which it is signed takes the value of 1. As before, we take this 
variable with one lag. 
To distinguish between the Fund’s two main functions, crisis prevention and 
resolution, we classify IMF programs in different groups. For crisis prevention, we take 
precautionary arrangements (PA) and see whether they help attract private capital flows. For 
crisis resolution, we consider Stand-by arrangements (SBA) accompanied or not by the 
Supplementary Reserve Facility (SRF),10 which basically increases the amount of financial 
assistance available. Although longer-term, we also include the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) 
since it is generally geared towards solving protracted balance of payments problems. 
In any event, as Table 6 in Appendix 2 shows, there is no one-to-one relation between the 
facilities and the crisis resolution objectives, since they do not always coincide with crisis 
cases. In any event, the percentage of cases in which they coincide is higher than for other 
programs. Finally, there is a third group of programs, which cannot be easily classified into 
crisis prevention or resolution, namely the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and 
its predecessors, the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and the Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility (ESAF). These are longer-term structural programs, aiming at reducing 
poverty and increasing sustainable growth, whose impact on capital flows we shall also test. 
When a country has two types of programs in one year, we assign the value of 1 to the 
program which has been in place more months that year and the value of 0 to the other 
program. There are a total of 1143 observations with an IMF program, the majority of which 
are SBA and PRGF (or old SAF or ESAF). 
In addition, to test whether the size of the IMF’s financial package influence the 
degree of catalysis, we construct two additional variables. The first one is the amount 
of financial assistance agreed, as a percentage of the country’s quota in the IMF capital. 
The average size is slightly below 100% of quota, and somewhat higher for SBAs. The 
second one is a dummy, which takes the value of 1 when financial assistance implies 
exceptional access to IMF resources.  This is above 100% of quota for SBAs EFFs and Pas, 
and comprises 12.5%, 71.4% and 14.4% of total observations, respectively.  Access above 
                                                                          
9. This is because we only take those observations for which data for FDI, portfolio and cross-border lending exists. In 
order words, we do not assume that any of these flows are equal to zero in case the data is missing. 
10. Since there are very few SRF to consider them separately and they are similar in nature to SBA, we sum them to 
the SBA observations. 
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limits is defined as above 140% of quota in the case of PRGF programs and we have 13.2% 
of PRGFs in this situation. 
Finally, we control for the main determinants of FDI, portfolio and cross-border bank 
lending, according to the existing literature (See Table 2 in Appendix 1 for a review of the 
literature on the determinants of each type of private capital flows). There are a number of 
factors which appear to affect all kinds of flows, namely the investment rate, the degree 
of political freedom, the domestic interest rate, the sovereign rating, and global economic 
growth. In addition, economic growth and the GDP per capita seem relevant for FDI and 
cross-border bank lending. The evolution of exports and the fact of participating in a trade 
block, in turn, could be relevant for FDI (or at least that which is export oriented). Finally, the 
level of external debt to GDP, inflation and international reserves in the host country, as well 
as the level of US interest rates, should be relevant for portfolio and cross-border flows 
but probably not for FDI. Given the very extreme values of some of the control variables 
(see Table 3 in Appendix 2), we eliminate the 1% of the distribution for public deficit and 
external debt over GDP, inflation, and the domestic interest rate. We end up with an 
unbalanced panel with a maximum number of observations of 1700. For total private capital 
flows, the number is further reduced to 684. 
4.2 Empirical challenges 
In our econometric analysis, there are several potential problems, which we need to take into 
account to obtain a consistent estimate of the IMF’s catalysis. The most important one 
is selection bias. Table 5 (in Appendix 2) shows that countries resorting to the IMF tend 
to have worse starting conditions. While we control for the contemporaneous and –when 
relevant– lagged determinants of capital flows, we cannot control for unobservable 
variables.11 To tackle the selection bias, we carry out three exercises. 
Starting  from the most intuitive but least rigorous, we take a smaller sample of 
countries, namely “problem” countries, in which those under an IMF program and those 
which are not should be more similar than in the total sample.  We define “problem” countries 
as those having undergone a crisis, be it currency, banking or sovereign one. Although for this 
subsample starting conditions are more similar for observations under IMF programs and not, 
the former still have worse starting conditions (see Table 5 in Appendix 2).  In addition, this 
strategy does not allow us to say something on crisis prevention and the number of 
observations is substantially reduced. 
As a second strategy, we conduct a two-stage estimation, similar to that of 
Edwards (2003), where we first estimate the probability of engaging in an IMF program, 
through a probit model. We, then, run the original regression within the sub-sample of 
countries with a relatively high likelihood of having an IMF program, whether they have one or 
not. The idea behind is that these countries should be more similar than those of the full 
sample mitigating the sample selection bias. The problem with this strategy is an identification 
one since the determinants of IMF programs also influence private capital flows. 
                                                                          
11. In addition, we estimate –with a binary model– the probability of engaging into a Fund program on the basis of its 
main determinants. We find that countries with poorer economic growth and a larger external debt service ratio have a 
higher likelihood of signing an IMF program (results can be obtained from the authors). 
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Finally, we use causal inference, a more rigorous technique to tackle selection bias. 
Among the existing methodologies for non-random exercises, we choose matching.12 
Applied to our case, this consists of selecting observations with the same probability of 
engaging in an IMF arrangement, and comparing the different effect of being under a program 
or not. The idea behind is that the bias is reduced when the comparison of outcomes is 
performed using treated and control subjects who are as similar as possible. Since matching 
subjects on an n-dimensional vector of characteristics is typically not feasible for a large n, 
this method proposes to summarize pre-treatment characteristics of each subject into a 
single-index variable (the propensity score), which makes the matching feasible. The 
propensity score, defined as in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), is the conditional probability of 
receiving a treatment given pre-treatment characteristics, namely: 
 
p(X) ≡  Pr{D = 1|X} = E{D|X} (1) 
where D = {0, 1} is the indicator of exposure to treatment and X is the multidimensional vector 
of pre-treatment characteristics. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if the exposure to 
treatment is random within cells defined by X, it is also random within cells defined by the 
values of the mono-dimensional variable p(X). As a result, given a population of units denoted 
by i, the propensity score p(Xi) –known the Average effect of Treatment on the Treated (ATT)– 
can be estimated as follows: 
 τ ≡  E{Y1i − Y0i|Di = 1} (2) 
Where Y1i and Y0i are the potential outcomes in the two counterfactual situations of 
treatment and no treatment, respectively. Then, taking the expected value and conditioning 
to the probability of the event: 
= E{E{Y1i − Y0i|Di = 1, p(Xi)}} (3) 
= E{E{Y1i|Di = 1, p(Xi)} − E{Y0i|Di = 0, p(Xi)}|Di = 1}  (4) 
where the outer expectation is over the distribution of [p(Xi)|Di = 1].13 
An estimate of the propensity score is not enough to estimate the ATT of interest 
using equation (2). The reason is that the probability of observing two units with exactly 
the same value of the propensity score is zero, in principle, since p(X) is a continuous variable. 
Various methods have been proposed in the literature to overcome this problem. The first one 
is the Nearest Neighbor, which matches treated and control units by taking each treated 
unit and searching for the control unit with the closest propensity score (i. e., the Nearest 
Neighbor). Once each treated unit is matched with a control unit, the difference between the 
outcome of the treated units and the outcome of the matched control units is computed. 
The ATT of interest is, then, obtained by averaging these differences. The stratification 
method, instead, takes blocks of observations with the same propensity score on average. 
The problem with this method is that those treated units for which no control is available in 
their block will be discarded.  The Nearest Neighbor, in turn, makes matches with the closest 
observation, which is good when data is limited but could lead to relatively different pairs. 
                                                                          
12. In a seminal work, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed propensity score matching as a method to reduce the 
bias in the estimation of treatment effects with observational data sets. 
13. See Becker and Ichino (2005) for details on the procedure used. 
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To mitigate this problem, two additional methodologies have been developed: Kernel and 
Radius. The first calculates a weighted average of all controls with weights that are inversely 
proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of treated and control units 
(Kernel). The second predetermines a maximum distance of propensity scores between 
treated and control units (a maximum “radius”). Between the two, the Kernel method is our 
preferred option because our sample characteristics (extreme observations and high volatility 
for some of the regressors). In any event, we conduct robustness tests with two other 
methods (Nearest Neighbor and Stratification). The results hardly change. 
We now move to the second challenge of our empirical exercise, namely 
endogeneity. This is because of potential simultaneity or, even, reverse causality, from our 
dependent variable, private capital flows, to some regressors (such as the investment rate 
and GDP growth). To have some information on which regressors could suffer from reverse 
causality, we run Granger-casualty tests between the dependent variable and each regressor. 
Those variables for which the test shows reverse causality are included in our main regression 
with a lag. 
The third potential problem is unobserved heterogeneity. We include fixed or 
random effects, on the basis of the result of the Hausman test. Finally, collinearity does not 
seem to be a very big issue in our sample given the relatively low correlation between 
variables, except for the rating and GDP per capita (Table 4 in Appendix 2). 
4.3 Results 
As first step, we test the impact of IMF programs on different types of private capital 
flows, when controlling for the main determinants of such flows. In this benchmark exercise, 
we do not differentiate between IMF objectives or IMF programs, nor do we control for 
sample selection. This allows us to compare our results with those of the existing literature. 
We estimate with fixed effects or random effects, based on the result of the Hausmann test 
for each type of capital flow.14 We also lag the regressors for which the Granger causality 
tests points to reversed causality, so as to minimize endogeneity problems. We find that 
engaging in an IMF program fosters FDI at a 95% significance level (Table 1 below). The size 
of the coefficient is large comparing it with other control variables. On the contrary, IMF 
programs discourage other investment (i. e., cross-border banking flows) at a 99% 
confidence level. The coefficient is nearly three times larger than for FDI. Finally, no significant 
impact is found for portfolio or total private capital flows. 
As for the control variables, a high investment rate, market size (measured by per 
capita GDP) and the sovereign rating contribute to higher FDI. Also, faster global growth 
encourages FDI. The domestic interest rate, which can be understood as the local cost of 
financing FDI, the lack of political freedom and capital account restrictions have the expected 
negative sign in the FDI equation but none of them is significant. Regarding portfolio flows, 
per capita GDP appears to foster portfolio flows while the lack of political freedom and a high 
level of external debt discourage them. Domestic investment, the interest rate, inflation, the 
sovereign rating and international reserves do not play a significant role in attracting portfolio 
flows. Third, high domestic investment, sovereign rating and domestic interest rates foster 
other investment flows (cross-border bank lending), while restrictions on the capital account 
and a large stock of external debt hamper this kind of flows. Finally, the results for total 
private capital flows are harder to interpret since they include all potential determinants of the 
different types of flows. The investment rate, economic and, to a lesser extent, export growth, 
and higher domestic interest rates seem to foster total flows. In turn, restrictions on capital 
account, inflation and external debt discourage total flows. 
                                                                          
14. In the case of FDI and other investment, the Hausmann test shows that fixed effects should be preferred. For 
portfolio flows and total flows, random effects are better. 
 BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0617 
Table 1: Impact of an IMF program on private capital flows 
 
 
Objective variables:
Have an IMF program_1 -0,4111 0,4014 ** -1,1979 *** 0,1664
(-0,80) (2,09) (-4,05) (1,12)
Control variables
a.- Country variables
Investment rate --- 0,0949 *** --- 0,0015
--- (6,01) --- (0,96)
Investment rate_1 0,1515 *** --- 0,1265 *** ---
(3,48) --- (5,64) ---
Lack of political freedom -0,1520 -0,0889 --- -0,1415 ***
(-0,78) (-1,16) --- (-2,80)
Lack of political freedom_1 --- --- 0,0917 ---
--- --- (0,85) ---
GDP per capita 0,0001 --- --- ---
(0,83) --- --- ---
GDP per capita_1 --- 0,0002 *** --- 0,0001 **
--- (3,25) --- (1,99)
Growth of GDP_1 0,1894 *** 0,0039 --- 0,0133
(3,75) (0,24) --- (0,86)
Change in exports --- 0,0023 --- ---
--- (0,67) --- ---
Change in exports_1 0,0191 * --- --- ---
(1,67) --- --- ---
Capital account restrictions --- -0,1934 --- ---
--- (-0,58) --- ---
Cap.account restrictions_1 -1,2517 * --- -2,1486 *** ---
(-1,78) --- (-3,85) ---
Trade bloc --- -0,0001 --- ---
--- (-0,32) --- ---
Trade bloc_1 -0,0001 --- --- ---
(-0,88) --- --- ---
Public sector balance -0,0792 --- --- ---
(-1,33) --- --- ---
Public sector balance_1 --- -0,0140 --- ---
--- (-0,70) --- ---
Domestic interest rate --- -0,0064 --- ---
--- (-1,47) --- ---
Domestic interest rate_1 0,0666 ** --- 0,0463 ** 0,0092
(2,39) --- (2,30) (0,79)
Rating --- 0,0835 *** 0,0823 ** ---
--- (3,48) (2,25) ---
Rating_1 0,0295 --- --- 0,0126
(0,56) --- --- (0,80)
External debt / GDP -0,0562 *** --- -0,0345 *** ---
(-4,92) --- (-5,78) ---
External debt / GDP_1 --- --- --- -0,0060 **
--- --- --- (-2,00)
Inflation rate_1 -0,0569 ** --- -0,0064 -0,0008
(-2,71) --- (-0,51) (-0,12)
Reserves --- --- -0,0050 0,0008
--- --- (-0,38) (0,17)
Reserves_1 -0,008 --- --- ---
(-0,44) --- --- ---
b.- World variables
World growth_1 -0,5935 *** 0,1390 * -0,1541 -0,1229 *
(-2,74) (1,81) (-1,34) (-1,91)
Long term US int.rate_1 -0,1294 --- 0,3258 *** 0,0017
(-0,98) --- (5,42) (0,05)
Intercept 7,8171 -0,8902 0,4738 0,7822
(3,44) (-1,30) (0,40) (1,30)
Number of observations 684 1648 1656 807
R2 10.56% 16.27% 5.44% 9.05%
(a) Estimation with fixed effects, excluding outliers (1% extreme of samples)
(b) Estimation with random effects, excluding outliers (5% extreme of samples)
Fixed or random effects chosen on the basis of Hausmann test.
Series lagged one  period are shown indicated by _1
***: significant at 1% level. **: significant at 5% level. *: significant at 10% level.
Total flows (b) FDI (a) Other investment (a) Portfolio investment (b)
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As a second step, we test whether the degree of catalysis of IMF programs is 
different depending on their objective. For the objective of crisis prevention, we test 
whether precautionary arrangements help countries attract different types of private private 
flows, when other relevant factors are controlled for.15  This is clearly the case for FDI, at a 
99% significant (Table 2). The coefficient is much larger than the previously found one for IMF 
programs as a group. 
For crisis resolution, we test the impact of those programs more geared toward 
that objective, namely SBAs (with or without SRFs) and EFFs. This is found negative and 
highly significant for cross-border bank flows. The coefficient is even larger than that 
previously found for all IMF programs. In turn, EFFs seem to attract portfolio flows in a 
significant way. Finally, longer-term concessional programs are found to encourage FDI 
although with a much lower coefficient than precautionary programs. 
Table 2: Impact of different IMF program according to their objectives 
 
We now move to tacking selection bias in the way described in the methodological 
section. As a preliminary exercise, we take the subsample of countries having undergone 
a crisis –which should be more similar than those in the full sample– and test whether 
the existence of an IMF program helps catalyse private flows. Apart from tackling sample 
selection, at least to some extent, this exercise helps answer the question of what is the 
Fund’s role in crisis resolution in a different way. In fact, we can test whether the Fund was 
successful –independently of the program– in managing crises for all countries which ever 
experienced a crisis. 
The results show that the Fund contributes to attracting FDI in crisis situations (those 
where sample selection is better controlled for) but not in non-crisis ones (see Table 3 below).   
However, the coefficient for the crisis cases is not larger than for the total sample, pointing to 
no downward bias due to sample selection. In addition, and as one would expect, the result 
is the reversed for precautionary arrangements, i. e., FDI is attracted in non-crisis 
observations. When differentiating among crises, the catalysis of FDI is lost. For sovereign 
                                                                          
15. The results for the control variables are available upon the request. 
Objective variables:
Have an IMF program
     1.- Crisis resolution:
               SBA / SRF_1 -0,7889 0,1688 -1,2404 *** 0,0898
(-1,41) (0,76) (-3,65) (0,54)
               EFF_1 0,1257 0,6619 * -1,6563 *** 0,4463 **
(0,17) (1,87) (-3,02) (2,08)
     2.- Long term concesional
               PRGF_1 0,6871 0,6135 ** -0,1934 -0,1126
(0,64) (2,07) (-0,43) (-0,43)
     3.- Crisis prevention
               Precautionary_1 1,4143 1,7866 *** 0,9622 0,1243
(1,55) (3,98) (1,39) (0,48)
Control variables No change No change No change No change
Number of observations 684 1648 1656 807
R2 11.02% 17.05% 5.36% 8.83%
(a) Estimation with fixed effects, excluding outliers (1% extreme of samples)
(b) Estimation with random effects, excluding outliers (5% extreme of samples)
Fixed or random effects chosen on the basis of Hausmann test.
Variables marked with a low hypehn and a 1 have been introduced with a lag.
***: significant at 1% level. **: significant at 5% level. *: significant at 10% level.
Total flows (b) FDI (a) Other investment (a) Portfolio investment (b)
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crises, IMF programs even seem to discourage FDI for non crisis observations. In any event, 
results by type of crisis need to be taken with caution since the number of observations is 
substantially reduced. Finally, the large negative impact of IMF programs on other investment 
is not found significant for the sample of crisis cases. This could be due to having controlled 
for the selection bias, but this approach is too simple to confirm such an hypothesis. 
Table 3: Impact of IMF programs differentiating between crisis and non-crisis 
 
 
Moving to the second approach to tackling the selection bias, we first estimate the 
probability of reaching an agreement with the IMF, through a probit model. We take four 
regressors as the most relevant ones (external debt service over GDP, GDP per capita, 
economic growth and the current account balance over GDP) and confirm that countries 
resorting to the Fund tend to be more vulnerable externally and poorer. If we restrict the limit 
to crisis countries, we still find that those engaging in IMF programs have worse conditions, 
although the difference with those under crisis and without IMF programs is smaller than in 
the case of the full sample. This indicates that the sample selection problem has not been 
totally eliminated in the previous exercise. Taking into account this fact, we conduct a 
two-step estimation, first calculating the probability of engaging in an IMF program with 
a variable which should determine such probability without being an explanatory variable 
of capital inflows. We choose the ratio of external debt over GDP. Second, we use that 
probability as a proxy for the objective variable (having an IMF program) and include it in a 
regression of determinants of different types of capital flows. The results (shown in the third 
row of Table 4 below) confirm –and even enhance because of the larger coefficient– the 
positive impact of IMF programs on FDI, which had been found before controlling for sample 
selection (first row of the same table). Precautionary arrangements are even more positive, in 
terms of catalysis, than in the benchmark exercise in as far as their impact on total private 
flows is significant, with a very large and positive coefficient. Finally, IMF programs discourage 
cross-border bank lending with an even larger coefficient than before controlling for sample 
selection. 
 
Whole sample -0,41 1,41 0,40 ** 1,79 *** -1,20 *** 0,96 0,17 0,12
No crisis -0,88 3,48 *** 0,17 3,24 *** -1,56 *** 0,74 0,16 0,55 *
Crisis 0,96 -0,26 0,47 * -0,54 -0,54 1,30 0,41 -0,42
     of which Sovereign 0,15 -1,00 0,47 -2,10 * -0,96 -0,98 0,54 -0,21
     of which Banking 0,49 -2,41 -0,24 0,23 -0,18 -0,87 0,34 -0,27
     of which Exchange rate (c) (c) -0,40 4,77 7,62 ** -0,49 0,21 0,89
Number of observations
Whole sample 684 1648 1656 807
No crisis 442 1065 1073 545
Crisis 242 583 583 347
     of which Sovereign 104 357 368 120
     of which Banking 142 241 227 148
     of which Exchange rate 50 99 93 58
(a) Estimation with fixed effects, excluding outliers (1% extreme of samples)
(b) Estimation with random effects, excluding outliers (5% extreme of samples)
(c) Cannot be estimated as there are not enough observations.
Fixed or random effects chosen on the basis of Hausmann test.
Dummy variables for IMF programs have been introduced with a lag.
***: significant at 1% level. **: significant at 5% level. *: significant at 10% level.
Total flows (b)
 IMF program Precautionary  IMF program
FDI / GDP (a)
 IMF program Precautionary Precautionary
Portfolio investment / GDP (b)
 IMF program Precautionary
Other investment / GDP (a)
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Table 4: Impact of IMF programs when tackling the selection bias 
 
When controlling for sample selection in the best way possible –using the matching 
technique– the results obtained in the benchmark regression are clearly reinforced: 
precautionary arrangements contribute with an even higher coefficient to attracting FDI 
(Line 4 in Table 4 above) and even total capital flows. Remaining IMF programs appear to 
reduce cross-border bank flows to a larger extent than when sample selection is not 
controlled for. Interestingly, IMF programs –except for precautionary arrangements– are not 
found significant in attracting FDI. This is explained by the counteracting results found for 
each type of program; namely short-term crisis resolution-type programs actually discourage 
FDI in a significant way (as opposed to the benchmark exercise). Instead, longer-term 
concessional programs attract FDI with an even larger coefficient (Table 5 below). Since 
these effects net out, there is no significant impact of IMF programs on FDI as a group. 
As for the negative influence of IMF programs on cross-border lending, it appears to be 
fully due to short-term crisis management oriented programs, such as SBAs and EFFs. 
Finally, PRGF seem to discourage portfolio flows when controlling for sample selection. 
This result, however, needs to be taken with caution since all emerging countries are included 
and many –particularly those under PRGF– do not have market access so that they hardly 
receive portfolio flows. We shall come back to this issue later, when we separate countries 
with and without market access in the regressions. 
Table 5: Catalysis of IMF programs using matching to tackle the selection bias 
 
Whole sample (a) -0,41 1,41 0,40 ** 1,79 *** -1,20 *** 0,96 0,17 0,12
Crises subsample (a) 0,96 -0,26 0,47 * -0,54 -0,54 1,30 0,41 -0,42
Two step (b) 0,56 2,08 ** 0,69 ** 2,40 *** -1,04 0,85 0,19 0,25
Matching (c) -0,94 ** 1,98 ** 0,26 2,77 ** -1,41 *** 0,28 0,05 0,38
(a) Estimation with fixed (FDI and Other investment) or random effects (total flows and Portfolio flows), excluding outliers.
(b) Variables for sample selection: total external debt service over GDP and, in some cases, per capita GDP.
(c) Kernel model chosen. Bootstrapped t-ratios used to calculate significance levels.
Dummy variables for IMF programs have been introduced with a lag.
***: significant at 1% level. **: significant at 5% level. *: significant at 10% level.
Precautionary
Portfolio investment / GDP
 IMF program Precautionary
Other investment / GDPTotal flows
 IMF program Precautionary  IMF program
FDI / GDP
 IMF program Precautionary
Have an IMF program -0,94 ** 0,26 -1,41 *** 0,05
(-1,98) (1,13) (-5,21) (0,35)
Of which
     1.- Crisis resolution:
               SBA / SRF -1,39 *** -0,68 *** -1,75 *** 0,02
(-2,39) (-2,65) (-4,60) (0,14)
               EFF -0,52 0,39 -1,06 ** 0,38
(-0,68) (1,14) (-2,65) (1,21)
     2.- Long term concesional
               PRGF -0,44 0,96 ** -0,11 -0,60 ***
(-0,56) (2,33) (-0,31) (-7,41)
     3.- Crisis prevention
               Precautionary 1,98 ** 2,77 *** 0,28 0,38
(1,82) (3,73) (0,51) (1,13)
(a) Kernel model. Bootstrapped t-ratios in parentheses.
Dummy variables for IMF programs have been introduced with a lag.
***: significant at 1% level. **: significant at 5% level. *: significant at 10% level.
Total flows FDI / GDP Portfolio investment / GDPOther investment / GDP
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In sum, although sample selection does seem to bias the coefficients, the general 
message is still the same: precautionary arrangements and longer-term structural programs 
clearly contribute to attracting FDI but shorter-term, crisis resolution oriented, programs do 
not. Furthermore, they discourage other types of flows, in particular cross-border bank 
lending. 
From these general results we now investigate a number of questions, which may be 
relevant for policy makers. To do so, we turn to the econometric methodology used in 
the benchmark exercise so that our results can be compared with others in the literature. 
The first question tries to explore which channel is more important when determining 
IMF catalysis. While this is clearly hard to test empirically and the case studies are certainly 
a better tool, we look for a preliminary answer by differentiating between announcing a 
program or persevering with it. The first should reflect the signalling and/or liquidity 
channel (except in the case of precautionary arrangement where it would only be signalling) 
and the second could be more related to the change in policies through compliance with 
conditionality. In the benchmark exercise we had estimated the impact of the whole duration 
of the program. To test what would be the announcement affect, we use a different objective 
variable, which takes the value of 1 only in the year the program in signed and zero 
thereafter.16. 
From the results obtained, the duration of the program seems to be more relevant in 
attracting private capital flows than the announcement effect, at least for FDI (Table 6 below). 
Only in the case of cross-border bank lending both the announcement effect has a strong 
negative impact, in the same way as the duration effect. This seems to suggest that it is the 
compliance with IMF conditionality which makes the difference for private investors. Such 
result is in line with the case studies analyzed later in the paper. 
Table 6: Announcement versus duration effects of IMF programs 
 
A second question we pose ourselves is whether larger IMF financial packages 
attract more capital inflows.  The increasing share of private capital flows as compared 
with official flows raises the issue of the optimal size of IMF financial packages. A relatively 
large number of programs have been granted access above access limits: 26% of them in 
the case of SBA, EFF and SRF programs, 15.2% of PRGFs, and 16.8%  of precautionary 
                                                                          
16. We have constructed this variable in such a way that the announcement effect only refers to genuine “new” 
programs; that is, it does not include the announcement of the renovation of existing programs. 
 IMF program Precautionary  IMF program Precautionary  IMF program Precautionary  IMF program Precautionary
Announcement (c) -0,74 -1,17 -0,00 -0,23 -1,16 ** 0,63 0,12 0,09
Duration (d) -0,22 2,14 ** 0,69 *** 2,49 *** -1,26 ** 1,07 0,19 0,11
(a) Estimation with fixed effects, excluding outliers (1% extreme of samples)
(b) Estimation with random effects, excluding outliers (5% extreme of samples)
(c) First two years of programs
(d) Rest of years of programs
Fixed or random effects chosen on the basis of Hausmann test.
Dummy variables for IMF programs have been introduced with a lag.
***: significant at 1% level. **: significant at 5% level. *: significant at 10% level.
Total flows (b) FDI / GDP (a) Other investment / GDP (a) Portfolio investment / GDP (b)
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arrangements.17 We present a set of regressions which intends to clarify whether larger 
programs attract more private flows than smaller ones (Table 7 below). An increase in the size 
of the programs leads to higher FDI flows while it discourages cross-border bank lending 
even further. EFF seem to be effective in terms of catalysis when large enough, namely above 
access limits. 
Table 7: Program size and catalysis of private flows 
 
Finally, we differentiate between countries with and without access to the 
international capital markets since the latter should be irrelevant for portfolio flows. 
Furthermore, access to portfolio flows could even influence developments in FDI and 
cross-border bank lending in as far as they could be substitutes or complements. We define 
countries with “market access” as those having been assigned a rating by Moody’s.18 
                                                                          
17. Access limits are 100% of quota for SBA, EFF, SRF and precautionary arrangements while it goes up to 150% for 
longer-term concessional programs. 
18. This is a definition of “potential” market access, not “effective” access to markets, which we would have by taking 
the countries having issued some kind of debt in international markets. This more restrictive definition would have 
substantially reduced the sample of countries with market access and might be biased in as far as some countries do 
not issue debt because of lack of need and not lack of market access. 
Size (c) Over (d) Below (d) Size (c) Over (d) Below (d) Size (c) Over (d) Below (d) Size (c) Over (d) Below (d)
Have an IMF program -0,44 * -0,13 -0,62 0,23 ** 0,94 *** 0,17 -0,61 *** -1,76 *** -0,97 *** 0,09 0,30 0,07
Of which:
     1.- Crisis resolution:
               SBA / SRF -0,82 *** -1,75 * -0,44 0,13 0,99 ** -0,03 -0,71 *** -2,85 *** -0,82 ** -0,06 -0,13 0,14
               EFF 0,60 * 0,79 -2,32 * 0,11 0,68 * 0,61 -0,28 -1,45 ** -2,31 ** 0,36 *** 0,68 *** -0,23
     2.- Long term concesional
               PRGF 1,04 1,16 1,02 1,31 *** 3,35 *** 0,21 -0,31 -0,24 -0,17 -0,19 -0,24 0,02
     3.- Crisis prevention
               Precautionary 1,24 5,33 *** 0,35 0,83 * 1,15 1,91 *** 1,20 4,41 ** 0,42 -0,26 -0,48 0,24
(a) Estimation with fixed effects, excluding outliers (1% extreme of samples)
(b) Estimation with random effects, excluding outliers (5% extreme of samples)
(c) Including a regressor representing the amount agreed over quota of each country
(d) Including a dummy for programs over or below quota
Fixed or random effects chosen on the basis of Hausmann test.
Dummy variables for IMF programs have been introduced with a lag.
***: significant at 1% level. **: significant at 5% level. *: significant at 10% level.
Total flows (b) FDI (a) Other investment (a) Portfolio investment (b)
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Table 8: IMF catalysis for countries with an without market access 
 
When differentiating among countries with and without market access, the IMF 
positive impact on FDI is restricted to countries without market access. As before, the 
effect mainly stems from precautionary arrangements and, to a lesser extent, structural 
programs (PRGF). Second, the negative impact on IMF programs on cross-border bank 
lending is also concentrated on countries without market access and continues to occur 
only under crisis resolution programs. Interestingly, precautionary arrangements actually 
encourage cross-border bank lending in countries with market access; this is also the case 
of EFFs for portfolio flows. Finally, we do not find confirmation of PRGF discouraging portfolio 
flows when separating between countries with and without market access. 
Access No Access Access No Access Access No Access Access No Access
Have an IMF program 1,77 ** -1,23 ** 0,05 0,46 ** 0,52 -1,39 *** 0,27 -0,00
Of which:
     1.- Crisis resolution:
               SBA / SRF 1,29 -1,52 ** -0,03 0,37 0,74 -1,47 *** 0,01 0,14
               EFF 2,40 ** -0,81 0,21 0,78 -0,04 -1,78 ** 0,87 ** -0,21
     2.- Long term concesional
               PRGF -0,40 0,66 0,01 0,47 * 0,59 -0,33 -0,80 -0,11
     3.- Crisis prevention
               Precautionary 2,40 ** 0,65 0,07 4,29 *** 2,17 *** 0,05 -0,11 0,93 **
Number of observations 313 371 437 1211 372 1284 343 434
R2 14.54% 19.58% 10.24% 17.61% 4.13% 6.78% 8.98% 5.77%
(a) Estimation with fixed effects, excluding outliers (1% extreme of samples)
(b) Estimation with random effects, excluding outliers (5% extreme of samples)
Fixed or random effects chosen on the basis of Hausmann test.
Dummy variables for IMF programs have been introduced with a lag.
***: significant at 1% level. **: significant at 5% level. *: significant at 10% level.
Total flows (b) FDI (a) Other investment (a) Portfolio investment (b)
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5 Case studies 
5.1 Methodology and countries included 
The rationale for completing our empirical research with case studies is that regression 
analyses based on a large number of countries are characterized by a level of aggregation 
which conceals valuable information. In the particular case of IMF catalysis, regression 
analysis does not allow to disentangle the channels through which IMF programs may 
influence the behaviour of private investors: namely the policy, liquidity and signalling channels 
described in the introductory section. On the other hand, the case study methodology has 
some limitations. Based on a much smaller sample, it lacks the possibility of generalizing the 
results. However, the aim of our case studies is not so much to draw general conclusions, but 
to analyse which channels of IMF catalysis work and how. 
In defining our case study strategy we also face the challenge of defining a valid 
counterfactual. In the absence of statistical tools, we compare pairs of countries as similar as 
possible in terms of their attractiveness towards private capital inflows, one having resorted 
to the Fund for assistance but not the other.20 To ensure similarity to the extent possible, 
we calculate averages of three key determinants of private capital flows (per capita GDP, 
the investment rate and credit rating) during the 1970s and 1980s for 136 emerging 
and developing countries. We, then, classify these countries in deciles according to their 
attractiveness to capital inflows. We, then, restrict our sample to the countries that had a 
credit rating at some point since the early 1990s so as to exclude countries without market 
access. Having market access makes the country studies more relevant for portfolio flows 
(Table 1 in Appendix X shows the countries included in each decile for the first two variables 
(per capita GDP and the investment rate). 
We use the same methodology to analyze crisis resolution and crisis prevention 
episodes. In the first case, we choose pairs of countries which went through a full-fledged 
crisis, one having resorted to an IMF program but not the other. In the second case, 
we choose pairs of countries which were affected by a similar shock but did not end up in a 
crisis. A key issue, therefore, is how to define a crisis and vulnerability episodes. For the 
former, we consider crises those episodes of balance of payment pressure that were strong 
enough to have resulted in a change in the exchange rate regime or in a drastic devaluation of 
the currency. To this end, we use the index of exchange rate pressures constructed by 
Bubula and Otker-Robe (2003), calculated as a weighted average of exchange rate and 
interest rate changes, but used it more restrictively. Defining episodes of balance of payment 
vulnerability is less obvious. We concentrate on the vulnerability stemming from an external 
shock since it is probably closer to the spirit of the IMF’s role in crisis prevention. We choose 
a common event that sent a wave of financial distress to emerging markets, namely 
the Russian default in 1998, and avoid choosing cases which ended up in a full-fledged crisis 
as defined above.21 
With regard to the IMF programs, we use SBAs (combined with an SRF) for 
analyzing crisis resolution cases and precautionary arrangements for crisis prevention. In the 
                                                                          
20. It is important to note that we can only control for observed similarities (and not unobserved ones as in econometric 
techniques of causal inference) so as to choose the closest pair of countries. 
21. We preferred this to defining it in terms of exchange rate pressures, which in any event would have to be below the 
benchmark considered for currency crises.   
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first cases, the IMF programs were approved after the crisis was triggered so that they can be 
considered a crisis resolution instrument. In the second country studies, the IMF programs 
were in place prior to the emergence of the balance of payment vulnerability so that they were 
originally conceived as a crisis prevention tool. 
Table 9 below shows the pair of countries chosen for crisis resolution. These are 
similar in terms of attractiveness to capital flows (Appendix 5 shows how they rank in terms of 
per capita GDP and the investment rate as compared to other countries with market access). 
In addition, they have all undergone a full-fledged currency crisis at some point in time (T). 
Two countries managed the crisis resorting to an IMF program (South Korea and Brazil) while 
the others (Malaysia and Colombia) so that they are considered the counterfactuals. 
 
Table 9: Crisis resolution cases 
 
In the case of crisis prevention, to be as close as possible to the counterfactual, 
the pairs of countries chosen are similar, not only in terms of the main determinants of private 
capital flows, but also of their linkages to Russia. We, thus, restrict our sample to Latin 
American countries since they all have similarly limited economic relations with Russia. Finally, 
case studies should have entered an IMF precautionary arrangement prior to being hit by the 
Russian shock, namely Argentina and Peru, being Mexico and Chile their counterfactuals. 
 
Table 10: Crisis prevention cases 
 
We apply a before-after test, analyzing whether the presence of an IMF program 
made any difference with regard to the evolution of private capital flows both in the event of a 
crisis or a “vulnerable” period (when analyzing crisis prevention). We apply this approach to 
two temporal horizons: short and long-term. In the first case, we analyze the daily evolution of 
Countries Without an IMF program Countries with an IMF program (SBA)
Malaysia South Korea (*)
   t: December 1997    t: November 1997
   Program: SBA/SRF, December 1997
Colombia Brazil (*)
   t: September 1998      t: January 1998
   Program: SBA/SRF, December 1998  
t indicates the beginning of the crisis episode or the common shock
* indicates access above limit
Countries Without an IMF program Countries with an IMF precautionary arrangement
Mexico Argentina (*)
   t: August 1998    t: August 1998
   Program: EFF, Feb. 1998 (no disbursement)
Chile Peru
   t: August 1998    t: August 1998
   Program: EFF, July 1996  (some disbursement)
* indicates access above limit
t indicates the beginning of the crisis episode or the common shock
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spreads surrounding the date of the episode, which we refer to as the announcement 
effect. This is particularly useful to assess whether the IMF did manage to signal and 
improvement in the situation when the program was announced (i. e., the signaling channel) 
and also whether there was a liquidity effect when the first program disbursement took place. 
In the second, we look into the quarterly evolution of total capital flows, FDI, portfolio and 
other flows (cross-border bank lending) before and after the episode, which we refer to as the 
policy correction effect. This longer-term perspective should help us determine whether 
the compliance with the IMF conditionality encourage private flows. 
As opposed to the crisis management cases, crisis prevention ones can have a 
common date for the event for all countries, namely the date of the Russian default: 
August 17, 1998. This is clearly welcome because the push determinants of capital flows to 
emerging markets will also be common, reinforcing the comparability of the case studies. 
Another interesting feature is that it will allow us to disentangle the signalling and liquidity 
effects, which basically come together in the short-term in the crisis resolution cases. 
This is particularly true in the case of Argentina where there was no disbursement of its 
precautionary arrangements even after it was hit by the Russian crisis. 
5.2 Lessons from cases of crisis resolution 
5.2.1 PRIVATE FLOWS BEFORE THE CRISES 
The four case studies analyzed for crisis resolution, Brazil, Colombia, Korea and Malaysia, 
were important participants in the surge of capital flows to emerging markets in the early 
1990s. On average, between 1990 and 2002 net capital flows amounted to 2,93 per cent 
of GDP in Brazil, 4,15 per cent in Colombia, 3,87 per cent in Korea and 6,22 per cent in 
Malaysia. This surge in capital flows was mainly concentrated between 1990 and 1997, as 
a result of both international (push) and domestic (pull) factors. On the international side, 
cyclical developments in mature economies during the first half of the 90´s (recession and low 
interest rates) attracted international investors to Asian and Latin American countries. 
On the domestic side, Asian countries were experiencing an impressive period of fast 
economic growth, while economic prospects in Latin America had greatly improved after 
the implementation of an ambitious agenda of market-friendly reforms and the signing of the 
Brady plan for sovereign debt restructuring. Additionally, the trend towards the liberalization 
of the capital account had intensified, favouring the financial integration of the four countries 
analyzed with the rest of the world. However, at the time or just before the crisis in our case 
studies, capital inflows to emerging countries generally slowed down while volatility increased. 
Apart from the crisis themselves, there were push factors behind this development, such as 
improved economic conditions in Europe and the United States and increased risk aversion. 
There are significant differences in the volume and composition of capital flows 
towards our sample countries: In the Latin American countries, portfolio flows were key during 
the first half of the decade, and FDI during the second half of the decade. The Asian countries 
began the decade with a much higher volume of net capital flows (2,8% of GDP in Korea, 
and 4,5% of GDP in Malaysia). In Malaysia the most important category of capital inflows 
was FDI, which amounted to more than 6% of GDP during most of the first half of the 
decade. In Korea, the two most important components until 1997 were portfolio flows and 
cross-border bank loans. 
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5.2.2 THE CRISES AND IMF PACKAGES 
The countries chosen to analyze crisis resolution, Brazil and Korea (with IMF programs) and 
Colombia and Malaysia (without) not only had similar fundamentals to attract private flows but 
they also experienced a similar crisis in terms of exchange rate pressures. In addition, the four 
crises were rooted in the capital account. 
Still, there were differences, which do not make our case studies totally comparable 
(a more detailed summary of each crisis can be found in Appendix 3 and a brief overview of 
the crises’ dates and characteristics in Table11 below). First, Brazil and Colombia had larger 
public and current account deficits than in Malaysia and Korea. This explains why the crises in 
the last two countries came as much more of a surprise to most international observers. 
Second, the nature of the borrowers was different: In Malaysia, Korea the crisis was rooted 
in private sector over-borrowing. In Brazil (and to a lesser extent Colombia) it was the public 
sector which borrowed in excess. Third, the exchange rate crises in Malaysia, Korea and 
Colombia were sided by banking crises. Instead, the Brazilian banking sector was essentially 
sound at the time of the crisis, so that the trade-offs facing the authorities in the crisis 
resolution process were different. 
 
Table 11: Dates and key characteristics of four crises 
Countries Date currency 
crisis 
Change in 
Exchange 
Rate Regime 
Sovereign 
Debt Crisis Banking Crisis 
Date IMF 
package 
Brazil 1999 Q1 From a crawling 
peg to pure float 
No No 1998 Q4 
Korea 1997 Q4 From a tightly 
managed float to 
pure  float 
No Yes 1997 Q4 
Malaysia 1997 Q4 
From a tightly 
managed float to 
managed float. 
No Yes Non applicable 
Colombia 1998 Q3 
From a crawling 
peg to pure float 
one year after crisis. 
Meanwhile two 
depreciations 
No Yes Non applicable 
 
The IMF responded quickly to the authorities’ request for a program, both in Brazil 
and Korea (see Table 12 below for details). The rescue packages were very large, especially 
in Korea’s case, nine times above access limits. Additional resources were also substantial, 
particularly for Korea. Macroeconomic conditionality was strong for Brazil and less so for 
Korea. Structural conditionality was strong for both although with a different focus: the fiscal 
sphere in Brazil and bank and enterprise restructuring in Korea. 
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Table 12: Main features of IMF packages in crisis resolution cases 
 
In the next sections we review how foreign investors behaved in the aftermath of the 
crisis in the program countries (Brazil and Korea) and compare it with the counterfactuals 
(Colombia and Malaysia). We, first, concentrate on the short-term –or announcement effect– 
of an IMF program, analyzing the evolution of sovereign spreads. We, then, look into the 
medium-term impact  –or policy effect– focusing on private capital flows. 
5.2.3 ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECT 
Our case studies show some evidence of the existence of an announcement effect 
associated with the IMF rescue packages, as measured by the increased correlation of the 
spreads of crisis countries after the IMF programs were signed with the average spread of all 
emerging countries, measured by EMBI+ (Graphs 2-5 below). Such correlation was also 
much higher than that of counterfactual countries with the emerging countries’ average. 
When we look at the evolution country by country, Brazil did not succeed in restoring 
market confidence with the first IMF package and the sovereign spread continued its rise.  
One of the main problems was that the program did not include a change in the exchange 
rate regime although the market considered that the peg was unsustainable. This probably 
intensified speculative pressures on the Brazilian currency. Another problem was political 
uncertainty and lack of ownership of the program. In fact, there were indications that the 
program would face a strong opposition from Congress and the Brazilian States, although 
the Federal government was clearly committed. In turn, the announcement of a reviewed IMF 
package, which included the floating of the exchange rate, was followed by a fall in the 
sovereign spread. 
Type of 
program Amount % quota
Additional 
resources
Approval 
date
Expiration 
date Key macroeconomic conditionality Key structural conditionality
Brazil SBA / SRF US$ 18 billion 429%
WB/IDB: US$ 9 
billion Bilateral 
loans: US$ 15 
billion
Dec 2, 1998
SBA: Sep 14, 
2001; SRF: 
Dec 1, 1999
Original program: primary fiscal surplus of 
2,6% of GDP.Renewed program: primary 
surplus of 3,1% of GDP in 1999, 3,25% of GDP 
in 2000 and 3,35% of GDP in 2001
Original program: Fiscal responsability 
law; structural tax reform; pension reform; 
supportive monetary policy. Renewed 
program: drop of the peg; introduction of 
an inflation targeting system
Korea SBA / SRF US$ 21 billion 949%
WB/ADB: US$ 
14 billion 
Bilateral loans: 
US$ 20 billion
Dec 4, 1997
SBA: Dec 3, 
2000; SRF: 
Dec 17, 1998
Commitment to a small fiscal surplus and to a 
tight monetary policy. Progressive relaxation of 
these conditions.
Financial sector restructuring, 
reinforcement of financial regulation and 
supervision, corporate sector reform, other 
liberalization reforms.
   
Graph 2-5: Evolution of sovereign spreads in crisis resolution cases 
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In Korea, the rescue package was followed by a sharp rise in the sovereign spread. 
This was related to the fact that, soon after the approval of the program, the real level of 
usable reserves was leaked to the press bringing about a speculative attack on the domestic 
currency, the won. Another problem was the electoral process at that time, which raised 
doubts about the ownership of the program. Finally, the market considered the second line 
of defence associated with the program insufficient, which meant that the program could 
be under-funded. As a consequence of the rapidly deteriorating situation, the IMF promoted 
the participation of international lenders in the resolution of the Korean crisis. The form of 
private sector involvement was the roll-over of existing cross-border bank lending. 
Additionally, the IMF announced the revision of the SBA, which implied a much larger and 
more front-loaded financial package. Korean spreads fell soon after this announcement. 
The counterfactuals moved relatively close the EMBI+ of all emerging countries. 
In Malaysia, announcements of policy changes did not manage to revert the upward trend 
on spreads. Colombia performed better after the announcement of a number of policy 
measures regarding the restructuring of the financial sector and the curbing of fiscal 
spending. This relieved the upward pressure on the sovereign spread. 
5.2.4 POLICY EFFECT 
The evolution of quarterly capital flows after the crisis seems to indicate a relatively strong 
catalysis associated with IMF programs. Although it is always difficult to isolate the impact of 
the policy correction induced by the Fund from that of other equally important pull and push 
determinants of capital flows, there are reasons to believe that some of the policy measures 
did have a positive impact. In line with the results of the empirical analysis, however, such 
impact varies widely for different types of capital flows, being FDI the one which behaves best 
and cross-border loans worst. 
The key priority of the policy responses put forward by the four countries of the 
sample in order to cope with their respective crises was to restore confidence among 
international investors (Tables 2 to 5 in Appendix 3 list the main policies implemented by each 
of the four countries).  In Brazil, capital flows experienced a fast recovery, even compared to 
the counterfactual, as well as a fall in volatility after the renewed program was approved 
(Graph 6 below). This is basically explained by the substantial increase in FDI flows, which 
rose substantially, compared to a negative trend in the counterfactuals Graph 7 below), and 
also faster than in emerging markets in general. Cross-border bank lending recovered very 
slowly after the crisis (Graph 8 below) and portfolio flows did not change much before and 
after the crisis (Graph 9 below). 
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Graph 6-7 (*) 
 
 
(*) Period moving average. 
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Graph 8-9 (*) 
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In Korea, instead, a substantially lower volume of capital flows was registered in the 
post-crisis period (Graph 6 above). While this could be interpreted as absence of catalysis 
from the IMF program, a deeper look at the evolution of the different types of inflows yields a 
more optimistic view. Most of the fall in capital inflows is accounted for by a sharp reduction in 
cross-border bank lending, notwithstanding the maintenance of some borrowing lines, within 
the private sector involvement agreed with the Fund (Graph 8 above). However, because it is 
precisely domestic banks that had over-borrowed internationally, the fall in cross-border 
lending after the crisis can be regarded as a necessary consequence of the policy correction 
induced by the IMF program. In fact, the IMF conditionality included the reinforcement of the 
regulatory and supervisory framework, which probably implied less demand for cross-border 
bank loans to avoid large currency mismatches. In addition, FDI did increase, albeit slowly, 
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from the very low levels before the crisis (Graph 7 above). This, again, was in part due to the 
structural conditionality imbedded in the program: namely the restructuring and privatization 
of insolvent financial and non financial institutions and the opening up of the economy to 
foreign competition. Finally, portfolio flows rose right after the program was put in place, 
probably due to the restrictive monetary policy and the high real interest rates, and fell as 
monetary policy became laxer. 
Colombia and Malaysia opted not to call the IMF for assistance. The policy response 
implemented in each country was very different: Colombia carried out an orthodox 
stabilization, which did not depart substantially from IMF recommendations. Furthermore, it 
eventually engaged in a precautionary arrangement in December 1999. Malaysia, instead, 
relaxed the fiscal and monetary stance, bailed out troubled firms and resorted to capital 
controls in order to limit speculative pressures in the off-shore market and stabilize 
capital outflows. Both in Colombia and Malaysia, a reduction in total capital flows was 
observed in the quarters following the crisis. Furthermore, FDI fell substantially not only in 
Malaysia but also in Colombia, notwithstanding its orthodox policies. 
5.2.5 CONCLUSIONS FROM CRISIS RESOLUTION CASE STUDIES 
Some conclusions can be drawn from these experiences. First, the case of Korea highlights 
the importance of the format and size of the rescue package. One of the main reasons for its 
failure to generate an announcement effect was that the second line of defence was not truly 
available, which pointed to the program’s being under-funded. This probably avoided the 
liquidity channel to function properly. Second, Korea and Brazil, to a lesser extent, are good 
examples of how private sector involvement can help restore confidence. The key conditions 
in these cases were that such involvement arrived in the early stages of the crisis resolution, it 
was voluntary although coordinated by the IMF and supported by the central banks of lender 
countries. Third Korea’s case also illustrates the importance of transparency and a good 
communication strategy so that information leakages do not have such a devastating effect. 
Fourth, the case of Brazil, particularly its exchange rate policy, clearly shows how crucial it 
is for the Fund to impose appropriate policies in its conditionality.  This is true not only in the 
medium term, but also in the short term since private investors do not seem to react solely to 
the stamp of approval of the Fund but also to the policies behind it. Finally, both the cases of 
Brazil and Korea highlight the importance of program ownership for a positive announcement 
effect and how difficult it is to achieve it during electoral periods. 
5.3 Lessons from cases of crisis prevention 
5.3.1 PRIVATE FLOWS BEFORE THE SHOCK 
Between 1990 and 2002 net capital flows averaged 3,45 per cent of GDP in Argentina, 5,04 
per cent in Peru, 4,59 per cent in Mexico and 8,59 per cent in Chile. Leaving aside push 
factors such as the cyclical conditions of European and North American economies, the surge 
of capital flows to the region can be explained by the success of the stabilization policies 
introduced during the first half of the decade, the introduction of far-reaching market friendly 
structural reforms, and the completion of important free trade agreements such as Mercosur 
or NAFTA. 
The evolution of capital inflows during the period under analysis was not 
homogenous. At the beginning of the decade Argentina and Peru were registering 
negligible levels of capital inflows while Mexico and Chile were already absorbing net inflows 
above 7 per cent of GDP. In between 1991 and 1995, Peru and Argentina started to 
converge to the levels of Mexico and Chile in view of the success of macroeconomic 
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stabilization. In 1995, capital flows fell substantially in the region because of the Mexican 
crisis but recovered after 1996 reaching unprecedented levels in Argentina and Chile. 
In Peru, capital flows had started to fall even before the Russian crisis instead, because of an 
idiosyncratic shock (el Niño) and domestic problems. Regarding the composition of capital 
flows, FDI become the most important source of external financing since 1993 for the four 
case studies. With the exception of Chile, the second source of external finance was portfolio 
flows. Only in Chile did cross-border bank lending constitute an important source of external 
financing. This may be explained by the existence of exchange rate controls, which may have 
discouraged portfolio flows. 
5.3.2 THE RUSSIAN CRISIS AND THE SITUATION OF OUR CASE STUDIES AT THAT TIME 
Russia’s default in August 1998 can be considered the clearest case of an exogenous shock 
for the countries of our sample. One can think of three major reasons for this. First the crisis 
raised awareness about the general risks associated with emerging markets sovereign debt. 
Second, discrimination among emerging markets on the part of international investors was 
insufficient, reinforcing channels of financial contagion. Third, the response of the international 
community to the crisis, i. e. the non-bailout to Russia, signalled a new policy on the provision 
of financial rescues to distressed emerging markets leading to a re-assessment of risks. 
With the exception of Brazil, Latin America remained relatively insulated from the 
immediate effects of the Russian crisis in as far as most countries avoided a full-blown crisis. 
This can be partly explained by the important reforms implemented in the region in the 
aftermath of the Tequila crisis [Beattie (2000)]. For instance, Argentina had strengthened 
institutions related to the regulation and supervision of financial markets, Mexico had shifted 
to a flexible exchange rate regime, and Chile and Peru had introduced measures to limit 
current account deficits [Corbo (2000)]. In addition, two of the four countries, namely 
Argentina an Peru, had precautionary arrangements in place prior to the crisis, the first of 
which even above access limits (Table 13 below describes their main characteristics). 
Notwithstanding such insulation, the Russia’s default did lead to a sharp general increase in 
sovereign spreads in emerging countries and a reduction in short-term capital flows that also 
affected Latin America. 
 
Table 13: The IMF precautionary Programs for Argentina and Peru 
 
Although we have used the same methodology as in the crisis resolution cases 
to choose the closest possible counterfactuals, there are two reasons why it is much harder 
in this case: first, the number of countries under a precautionary arrangement before 
the Russian crisis erupted is smaller; second, they need to have equally small relations 
with Russia to make the external shock comparable. The countries chosen comply with 
both conditions but vary in their degree of vulnerability. In fact, the two case studies under 
Type of 
program
Amount 
granted % quota
Amount 
drawn
Approval 
date
Expiration 
date Key macroeconomic conditionality
Argentina EFF US$ 3093 million 135% 0 Feb 4, 1998 Feb 3, 2001
Contractionary fiscal policiy: gradual move to 
budgetary balance. Close monitoring of 
evolution of currente account. Commitment to 
implement corrective measures if current 
account deficit widens
Peru EFF US$ 369 million 53% US$ 269 million July 1, 1996
March 31, 
1999
Improve overall position of public sector form 
2,6% of GDP deficitin 1995 to balance in 1998. 
Increase primary surplus to 2% of GDP in 
1998. Limitis to contratc private short term 
debt. Tigth monetary policiy. Inflation to 
industrial countries level.
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the IMF before the crisis were more vulnerable and had worse fundamentals, as can be seen 
from their lower sovereign rating (see Table 14 below). This introduces a bias toward 
pessimistic findings since the catalysis is bound to be lower for more vulnerable countries. 
 
Table 14: Indicators of vulnerability 
 
5.3.3 THE SHORT-TERM EFFECT 
Graph 10 shows the evolution of sovereign spreads in Argentina, Mexico and Peru, together 
with the evolution of the Global EMBI for emerging markets, during the period surrounding 
the Russian default.21 
We can distinguish three phases in the evolution of sovereign spreads. The first is 
characterized by the stability and high correlation of spreads, and ends just before 
the Russian default. The second starts with the announcement of the Russian default 
on August 17, 1998 until end-September. During that period a drastic increase in the volatility 
of spreads was registered together with a substantial fall in the correlation of spreads. From 
end-September 1998, the third phase is characterized by a return to a relative stability 
and high correlation in the evolution of spreads and finishes with the Brazilian currency crisis. 
We do not consider the period following the devaluation of the Brazilian real because the 
impact of that crisis on the three countries analyzed in this section was asymmetric, given 
their different linkages with Brazil. 
During the first phase, Argentina and Peru had higher sovereign spreads than 
Mexico, in line with their larger vulnerability and worse sovereign rating. Towards the end of 
the first phase there was a hike in the Global EMBI, reflecting growing unrest among 
international investors because of Russia’s situation. Argentina, and Peru to a lesser extent, 
experienced a much less pronounced increase until Russia’s default occurred. Thereafter 
(in the second phase of Graph 10) Argentina performed nearly as poorly as the average 
emerging country. This suggests that Argentina was considered to be more vulnerable 
to contagion from Russia than the other two countries. The negative perception regarding 
Argentina is probably much more related to its exchange rate regime than to the 
precautionary arrangement. Argentina was under a currency board, while Mexico and Peru 
had floating regimes, at least de iure, implying that Argentina had less tools at its disposal to 
respond to the crisis and that –as the Russian experience showed– a speculative attack was 
more likely to occur. 
 
 
                                                                          
21. JP Morgan does not provide with an index of Chile’s sovereign spread until April 1999. 
Total ext. debt (% 
GDP)
Short term debt 
(% total debt)
Debt service (% 
of exports)
International 
Reserves 
(months of 
imports)
International 
Reserves (% of 
GDP)
Credit Rating
Argentina 47 22 58 6 8 Ba3
Chile 41 5 17 7 22 Baa1
Mexico 38 16 21 2 8 Ba2
Peru 54 21 24 9 17 Ba3
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Graph 10: EMBI Argentina, Mexico, Peru and Global 
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If we restrict the analysis to the cases of Mexico and Peru, with similar exchange rate 
regimes at the time of the Russian default, Peru’s better performance –particularly if 
we consider its weaker starting conditions and its higher spread before the crisis– could 
provide some evidence of a short term catalytic effect associated with its precautionary 
arrangement with the Fund. 
The third phase was characterized by a return to relatively stable spreads, albeit at a 
higher level, for all emerging countries. Mexican spreads remained at a higher level than those 
of Argentina and Peru, which again may indicate that, during turbulent periods, precautionary 
arrangements might have been regarded positively by international investors. Still, such 
signalling effect is much clearer for Peru than for Argentina, which might be explained by the 
exchange rate regime. 
5.3.4 THE POLICY EFFECT 
Our case studies and their counterfactuals were running important current account deficits at 
the time of the crisis: 4.7 per cent of GDP in Argentina, 7 per cent of GDP in Peru, 4 per cent 
of GDP in Mexico and 6.8 per cent of GDP in Chile. Furthermore, the general trend in 
the quarters prior to the crisis (less clearly so in the case of Peru) was a widening of this 
imbalance. This was primarily the result of a deterioration in the terms of trade of the region. 
In this respect, the time of the shock –the Russian crisis– constitutes a turning point, as it 
marked the beginning of a correction of the current account deficit in the four countries of 
the sub-sample. Chile went from a deficit of almost 7 per cent of GDP to a surplus 6 quarters 
after the crisis, while Argentina’s, Peru’s and Mexico’s current account tended to converge 
towards 3 per cent of GDP. This turning point was closely associated with the fact that the 
Russian default substantially worsened access to international finance in the four countries of 
the sub-sample, making it more difficult to sustain large current account deficits, and forcing a 
domestic adjustment. Indeed, as we can see in more detail in Tables 6-9 in Appendix 3, the 
authorities of the four countries of the sample implemented contractive macroeconomic 
policies in an attempt to reduce domestic absorption and close the external financing gap. 
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This trend was especially clear in the realm of monetary policy. Domestic interest 
rates were raised particularly in Mexico and Chile. Monetary policy began a gradual relaxation 
at least six months after the Russian shock. Fiscal policy was also contractionary except for 
Chile, which could let automatic stabilizers work given the accumulated surpluses before the 
Russian crisis. This tendency was especially pronounced in Argentina and Peru, where 
primary deficits peaked at 3 and 3.6 per cent of GDP respectively. Exchange rates hardly 
changed, not only in those countries with more rigid regimes such as Argentina (currency 
board) and Chile (crawling peg), but also in Peru and Mexico, with de iure flexible regimes. 
Economic growth decelerated, particularly in Chile. 
A comparative analysis of the evolution of total private capital inflows to the four 
countries of the sample shows that the impact of the Russian default was asymmetric. 
While Chile witnessed an increase in capital inflows relatively early (one quarter after the crisis) 
Mexico experienced a moderate fall and Argentina and Peru a substantial reduction. 
It, therefore, seems that the existence of a precautionary arrangement prior to the shock was 
not enough to counteract the higher degree of vulnerability of these two countries. In Peru, 
two negative events (El Niño and the  presidential elections) made it even harder for the 
precautionary arrangement to avoid a fall in inflows. In the same vein, the strength of the US 
economy clearly favoured Mexico more than Argentina or Peru. 
When looking at the composition of capital inflows, both Argentina and Peru 
continued to attract FDI for quite some time after the Russian default, but portfolio 
and cross-border bank loans registered an important reduction. One way to interpret this 
evidence is that IMF precautionary arrangements may influence the long term interest of 
investors in an economy, providing a certain degree of assurance about the sustainability 
of sound-macroeconomic policies. In any case, both the Argentine and the Peruvian cases 
show that for the IMF to be catalytic with a precautionary arrangement, the economic 
program needs to be credible. Indeed, a turning point can be identified in the evolution of FDI 
coinciding with the loss of credibility of the policy mix implemented by the Argentine and 
the Peruvian authorities. In the case of Argentina, it occurred as it became increasingly clear 
to international investors that the authorities were being unable to reduce public finance 
imbalances. In Peru, it occurred as macroeconomic discipline was eased, and as certain 
ambiguities emerged with regard to the direction of economic policy. In this case, the turning 
point in the evolution of FDI also coincides with the non completion of the program’s 
conditionality. The fact that FDI also remained robust in the counterfactual cases, Chile and 
Mexico, makes it difficult to support the hypothesis of a clear IMF catalytic effect in crisis 
prevention, at least in the medium term. However, the opposite cannot be confirmed either 
since Argentina and Peru had worse initial conditions. 
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Graphs 11-12 (*) 
 
 
(*) 2 period moving average. 
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Graphs 13-14 (*) 
 
(*) 2 period moving average. 
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5.4 Conclusions from crisis prevention case studies 
From this evidence, the existence of a precautionary program does not seem to have been a 
critical factor to attract private capital flows. Other factors of vulnerability, instead, shaped the 
behaviour of capital flows during the period analyzed. There is some evidence of an IMF 
catalytic role in the short-term as Peru experienced a less pronounced increase in spreads. 
No evidence, instead, can be found in the middle-term. This is mainly due to the fact that 
countries under a precautionary arrangement had worse starting conditions. The exchange 
rate regime was a crucial factor in the case of Argentina due to its simmilarity with the Russian 
regime. 
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6 Conclusions 
We use regression analysis and case studies to assess whether IMF programs contribute to 
attracting different types of private capital flows, namely FDI, portfolio and other flows, mainly 
bank cross-border lending. With both methodologies we distinguish among IMF objectives, 
namely crisis resolution and crisis prevention, but also longer-term programs, basically 
oriented towards sustainable growth and poverty reduction. 
Based on a large number of countries, the first methodology allows us to draw 
general conclusions and also to control for the existence of a sample selection bias. This bias 
stems from the fact that countries seeking IMF programs tend to be worse performers from 
the start and we cannot control for it fully.  Case studies, in turn, help us take into account 
countries’ own circumstances and analyze which channels (conditionality, liquidity and/or 
signalling) may be more relevant in influencing private flows. 
In the background of a rather pessimistic empirical literature on the IMF’s catalytic 
role, we confirm that IMF programs, as a group, do not help attract total private capital flows, 
even when controlling for sample selection in a number of ways. However, this general 
conclusion changes when differentiating among types of capital flows and IMF objectives. 
By type of flow, the IMF impact is positive for FDI but clearly negative for shorter-term 
flows, particularly cross-border bank lending. The results also differ markedly for different 
IMF objectives: programs oriented towards crisis resolution, such as the Stand-By 
Arrangement and the Supplementary Reserve Facility, actually discourage private capital 
flows, when controlling for sample selection. On the contrary, programs oriented towards 
crisis prevention, namely precautionary arrangements, perform very well in attracting private 
flows, particularly FDI. In addition, longer-term programs, such as the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility, contribute to attracting FDI. 
We also show empirically findings for a number of policy-relevant questions related 
to the IMF catalysis. First maintaining a program seems to be more relevant than its 
announcement. This could indicate that complying with the IMF conditionality is more 
important than the signalling which takes place when the program is signed. Second, larger 
IMF packages (understood as above access limits) are generally beneficial, particularly in the 
case of precautionary arrangements. Third, market access to capital flows does make a 
difference for capital flows to be attracted. 
The case studies –Brazil and Korea for crisis resolution and Argentina and Peru for 
crisis prevention– and the comparison with their counterfactuals (Malaysia and Colombia in 
the first case and Mexico and Chile in the second) offer a slightly more positive view of IMF 
catalysis for crisis resolution, at least for FDI. Finally, all case studies point to the role of 
conditionality –as opposed to signalling and liquidity– as the strongest channel through which 
IMF catalyzes private flows. 
Being catalysis an important objective for the Fund, our results could look worrisome given 
the apparent inability to attract capital flows with programs oriented towards crisis resolution. 
However, it is also true that the Fund is most successful with FDI, which has been the most 
relevant source of capital for most emerging and developing countries. In addition, the 
catalysis of long-term structural programs is also important given the growing relevance of 
sustainable growth and poverty reduction objectives in the international agenda.
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Table 1: Review of the literature on the IMF catalytic role 
 Objective Methodology Dependent variable Objective variables 
Sample and 
temporal domain 
Main findings 
Rodrik (1995) 
Rationale for existence of 
multilateral lending 
institutions in a world with 
well-developed 
international private capital 
markets, and substantial 
bilateral aid programs 
Basic regression 
Net private capital 
flows 
Official flows, 
distinguishing between 
multilateral and bilateral 
transfers, and between 
concessional and non-
concessional lending 
A sample of 
developing 
countries in Asia, 
sub-Saharan Africa 
and Latin America.  
1970-1993 
No evidence of  catalytic 
role  
Killick (1995) 
Impact of IMF supported 
programs in developing 
countries 
Case studies Not applicable Not applicable 
17 countries under 
an IMF program 
No catalytic effect: only 
in two countries was IMF 
program associated with 
larger capital inflows 
Schadler et al. 
(1995) 
Impact of IMF conditionality 
on a number of 
macroeconomic outcomes 
Case studies Not applicable Not applicable 
36 countries 
between 1988 and 
1992 
Catalytic effect only in a 
few cases 
Corbo and 
Hernández 
(1999) 
Role of fundamentals as 
determinants of capital 
flows 
Panel data  
FDI; portfolio flows; 
long-term private 
debt flows and sum 
of all private flows 
Variable reflecting “new 
lending from multilateral 
sources” 
73 countries 
1985-1994 
Capital flows positively 
correlated to “new 
lending from multilateral 
sources”  
Bird et al. (2000) 
Catalytic effect of 
multilateral lending 
institutions 
Case studies Not applicable Not applicable 
17 countries 
1980s and 1990s 
The involvement of 
multilaterals does not 
guarantee an inflow of 
capital from other 
sources 
Marchesi (2001) 
To assess the impact of 
IMF lending on the 
subsequent concession of 
a debt rescheduling 
Bivariate probit 
model 
Probit for the 
occurrence of a debt 
rescheduling 
Distinguishes between 
SBAs, EFFs, SAFs and 
ESAFs 
93 developing and 
transition 
economies 
1983-1996 
Adoption of an IMF 
program facilitates the 
rescheduling of existing 
loans  
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 APPENDIX 1: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Table 1: Review of the literature on the IMF catalytic role 
 Objective Methodology Dependent variable Objective variables 
Sample and 
temporal domain 
Main findings 
Benelli (2003) 
Comparison of actual 
capital flows and IMF 
projections after the 
concession of a program 
Panel data 
Net private capital 
flows 
Takes into account the 
size of and the 
adjustment induced by 
the programs 
105 SBA and 31 
EFF programs 
Actual capital flows fall 
short of projections in 
larger programs and in 
countries with access to 
capital markets  
Eichengreen, 
Kletzer, Mody 
(2004) 
mimeo 
Fund’s catalytic role in  
bond market and in bank 
lending; distinction 
between the IMF’s catalytic 
potential through 
monitoring/commitment 
and through lending 
Multinomial logit 
regression. 
Transactional 
data to reduce 
the severity of 
reverse causality 
Frequency of 
transactions and 
initial risk premium 
charged on credit 
Loan and bond 
transactions. Takes into 
account external 
debt/GDP ratio  
6 700 loan 
transactions, 3 500 
bond transactions 
1991-2002 
Stronger catalytic effect 
in the bond market than 
in bank lending. Catalytic 
effect correlated to the 
country’s level of 
external solvency 
Bordo, Mody & 
Oomes 
(2004) 
IMF programs’ role in 
helping countries (re)gain  
access to international 
capital markets and, if so, 
through which channels; 
and to explore the role of 
the country’s initial 
conditions 
Statistical 
comparison of 
the performance 
of program and 
non-program 
countries with 
similar initial 
conditions 
Gross bond, equity 
and loan flows 
Excludes 
SAF/ESAF/PRGF from 
the analysis. 
Distinguishes between 
SBAs and EFFs 
29 emerging 
markets 
1980-2002 
After a fall, IMF 
programs contribute to 
an improvement of 
capital inflows to 
countries departing from 
“intermediate” initial 
conditions 
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Table 1: Review of the literature on the IMF catalytic role 
 Objective Methodology Dependent variable Objective variables 
Sample and 
temporal domain 
Main findings 
Eichengreen & 
Mody (2001) 
Effect of IMF programs and 
contigent action clauses on 
access to financial markets 
Sample selection, 
maximum 
likelihood model 
Gross capital flows 
(new bond issuance) 
and spreads 
SBAs, EFFs and ESAFs 
International bonds 
issued by emerging 
markets. 
1991-1999 
Catalytic effect when the 
country concerned has 
intermediate credit rating 
and when programs 
introduced  limited 
structural conditionality 
Bird & Rowlands 
(2002) 
Catalytic impact of IMF 
lending, drawing a 
distinction between types 
of capital flow, and types of 
IMF program 
Panel data 
Net FDI/GDP; official 
flows/GDP; portfolio 
flows/GDP; Private 
source debt/GDP 
Distinguishes between 
SBAs, EFFs and 
ESAFs/PRGFs. Takes 
into consideration the 
country’s past record 
with IMF programs 
117 countries 
1977-1999 
No broad-based 
catalysis. SBAs have a 
positive effect on FDI in 
middle-income countries 
and a negative effect on 
portfolio flows. 
ESAFs/PRGFs have a 
negative effect on FDI 
Ghosh et al. 
(2002) 
Experience of eight IMF-
supported programs during 
the capital account crises 
of the 1990s 
Case studies Not applicable Not applicable 
Eight countries 
1990s 
Catalytic effect was 
systematically over-
estimated in the 
program figures 
Mody & Saravia 
(2003) 
Assessment of delegated 
monitoring function of the 
IMF 
High frequency 
panel data 
New bond issues 
(gross capital flows) 
and spreads on these 
bonds 
Size of programs, 
precautionary character 
and program duration  
3 066 bond 
issuances 
1991-2000 
No automatic catalytic 
effect. Found only under 
certain conditions 
relating to the country, 
the program and the 
relationship with the IMF 
Edwards (2003) 
 
Catalytic effect of IMF 
programs on portfolio flows 
and FDI, distinguishing 
among IMF facilities 
Hazard rate 
methodology to 
capture the effect 
of self-selection 
FDI/GDP and 
portfolio flow/GDP 
ratios 
SBAs and EFFs 
126 countries 
1979-1995 
IMF lending has a 
negative effect on both 
portfolio flows and FDI 
regardless of the type of 
facility 
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             Table 2: Literature review on determinants of capital inflows 
Determinant
Expected 
Effect on 
capital flows
Expected 
I Source
 Size of foreign debt - None
 Hernández et al.(1997); Corvo et al. (1999); Mody et al.(2001); Fiess  
 (2003)
 International reserves + None Hernández et al.(1997); Ashoka et al.(2001)
 Exports growth rate + None Hernández et al.(1997)
 Volatility real E/R - None Hernández et al.(1997)
 Trade openness +
 Haussmann et al.(2002); Albuquerque et al.(2002); Haussmann et 
 al.(2002) 
 Interest rate + None Taylor et al.(1997); Ashoka et al.(2001)
                                                    +
 Agédir (1998); Mody et al. (2001); Ewee-Ghee Lim (2001); Albuquerque 
 et al.(2002); Haussmann et al.(2002); Mody et al.(2003)
 Stock exchange 
 indexes + None Ashoka et al.(2001); Mody et al.(2001)
 GDP growth rate +
 Corvo et al.(1999); Corbo et al.(1999); Albuquerque et al.(2002); Fiess 
 (2003)
 Saving rate + None Hernández et al.(1997)
 Investment rate + None Hernández et al.(1997); Corvo et al.(1999)
 Credit Ratings + None Chuhan et al.(1993); Taylor et al.(1997); Mody et al.(2001)
 Market size +
 Loree et al. (1994); Kawaguchi (1994); Branard (1997); Dees (1998); 
 Billington (1999); Portes et al.(1999); Venables (2000); Fung, Izaka et al 
 (2000); Shatz et al.(2000); Stein et al.(2001); Haussmann et al. (2002); 
 AT Kerney
 Distance Portes et al. (1999); Shatz et al.(2000); Haussmann et al.(2002)
 Nat. resources 
 endowm. None + Haussmann et al.(2002)
 Infrastructure quality None + Ewe-Ghee Lim (2001); Stein et al.(2001)
 Clustering None + Ewe-Ghee Lim (2001)
 Human capital 
 endowment None + Stein et al. (2001); Wei (1997)
 
 Labour cost                             None -
 Ewee-Ghee Lim (2001); Kawaguchi (1994); Dees (1998); Wheeler et al. 
 (1992); Mody et al.(1998); Fung et al.(2000); Stein et al.(2001); 
 Albuquerque et al.(2002)
 Political stability None + AT Kerney; Ewe-Ghee Lim (2001)
 Quality of institutions; 
 Regulatory environment; 
 corruption; rule of law +
 Wheeler et al.(1992); Singh et al.(1995); Wei (1997); Ewee-Ghee Lim 
 (2001); Stein et al.(2001); Haussmann et al. (2002)
 Restrictions on FDI None - Kawaguchi (1994); Stein et al. (2001); Albuquerque et al. (2002)
 Fiscal 
 treatment/incentives  
 on FDI                                      None                     +
 Wheeler et al. (1992); Kawaguchi (1994); Wei (1997); Stein et al. (2001); 
 Albuquerque et al. (2002)
 Depth of the financial 
 system  +                     +
 Chen et al. (1997); Montiel et al. (2000); Albuquerque et al. (2002); 
 Haussmann et al. (2002)
 Participation in trade 
 agreements None + Ewe-Ghee Lim (2001); Stein et al.(2001); Levy-Yeyati et al. (2002)  
 
Ambiguous
Ambiguous
u
Ambiguous
Effect on FDI
Macroeconomic stability
 APPENDIX 2: DATA ISSUES 
Table 1: Countries included in the database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Region: Asia Access Crisis in at least one year Region: Africa Access Crisis in at least one year Region: Latin America Access Crisis in at least one year
Afghanistan no no Algeria no yes Antigua and Barbuda no yes
Bahrain yes yes Angola no yes Argentina yes yes
Bangladesh no yes Benin no yes Aruba no yes
Bhutan no yes Bostwana yes yes Bahamas no yes
Cambodia no yes Burkina Fasso no yes Barbados yes yes
China, Mainland yes yes Burundi no yes Belize yes no
China, Hong Kong yes yes Cameroon no yes Boliva yes yes
India yes yes Cape Verde no yes Brazil yes yes
Indonesia yes yes Central African Rep. no yes Chile yes yes
Iran yes yes Chad no yes Colombia yes yes
Korea yes yes Comoros no no Costa Rica yes yes
Lao no yes Congo, Dem. Rep. no yes Dominica no no
Malaysia yes yes Congo, Rep. no yes Dominican Rep. yes yes
Maldives no yes Côte d'Ivoire no yes Ecuador yes yes
Mongolia no yes Djibouti no no El Salvador yes yes
Myanmar no yes Egypt yes yes Grenada no no
Nepal no yes Equatorial Guinea no yes Guatemala yes yes
Oman yes no Eritrea no no Guyana no yes
Pakistan yes yes Ethiopia no yes Haiti no yes
Phillippines yes yes Gabon no yes Honduras yes yes
Singapore yes yes Gambia no yes Jamaica yes yes
Sri Lanka no yes Ghana no yes Montserrat no no
Thailand yes yes Guinea no yes Netherlands Antilles no no
Turkey yes yes Guinea-Bissau no yes Nicaragua yes yes
Vietnam yes yes Kenya no yes Panama yes yes
Region: Middle East Access Crisis in at least one year Lesotho no yes Paraguay yes yes
Israel yes yes Liberia no yes Peru yes yes
Jordan yes yes Libya no no Mexico yes yes
Kuwait yes yes Madagascar no yes St.Kitts no no
Lebanon yes yes Malawi no yes St.Lucia no no
Saudi Arabia yes no Mali no no St.Vincent no no
Syria no yes Mauritania no yes Suriname no no
Yemen, Rep. no yes Mauritius yes yes Trinidad and Tobago yes yes
Region: Europe Access Crisis in at least one year Morocco yes yes Uruguay yes yes
Albania no yes Mozambique no yes Venezuela yes yes
Armenia no yes Namibia no yes
Azerbaijan no yes Nigeria no yes
Belarus no yes Niger no yes
Bosnia & Herzegovina no yes Rwanda no yes
Bulgaria yes yes Senegal no yes
Croatia yes yes Seychelles no yes
Cyprus yes yes Sierra Leone no yes
Czech Rep. yes yes Somalia no no
Estonia yes yes South Africa yes yes
Georgia no yes Sudan no yes
Hungary yes yes Swaziland no yes
Kazakhstan yes yes Sao Tome no yes
Kyrgyz Rep. no yes Tanzania no yes
Latvia yes yes Togo no yes
Lithuania yes yes Tunisia yes yes
Macedonia FYR no yes Uganda no yes
Malta yes yes Zambia no yes
Moldova yes yes Zimbabwe no yes
Poland yes yes Region: Oceania Access Crisis in at least one year
Romania yes yes Fiji yes yes
Russia yes yes Kiribati no no
Slovak Rep. yes yes Papua New Guinea yes yes
Slovenia yes yes Samoa no yes
Tajikistan no no Solomon Island no yes
Turkmenistan yes no Tonga no yes
Ukraine yes yes Vanuatu no yes
Uzbekistan no no
Yugoslavia no yes
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Table 2: Variable definitions and sources  
Variable Definition Source Comments
Dependent
FDI / GDP Direct investment in reporting economy divided by nominal GDP IFS, line 78bed (line 99 for GDP) Represents private inflows of each type of capital
in each country; when data is missing in IFS, equivalent WDI data used
OI / GDP Other investment liabilities divided by nominal GDP IFS, line 78bid (line 99 for GDP) Represents private inflows of each type of capital
in each country; when data is missing in IFS, equivalent WDI data used
PI / GDP Portfolio investment liabilities divided by nominal GDP IFS, line 78bgd (line 99 for GDP) Represents private inflows of each type of capital
in each country; when data is missing in IFS, equivalent WDI data used
Objective
IMF programs Dummy taking value of 1 if country sign an IMF program in year t, 0 otherwise
     of which SBA Dummy taking value of 1 if country sign a SBA program in year t, 0 otherwise
     of which PRGF Dummy taking value of 1 if country sign a PRGF program in year t, 0 otherwise
     of which SRF Dummy taking value of 1 if country sign a SRF program in year t, 0 otherwise
     of which EFF Dummy taking value of 1 if country sign a EFF program in year t, 0 otherwise
     of which precautionary Dummy taking value of 1 if country sign a precautionary
program in year t, 0 otherwise
Size of program Amount agreed in each type of program as
percentage of country's quota in year program is signed
Own elaboration ---
Control
a.- Long term potential growth
and market size
     Investment rate Fixed capital formation as percentage of GDP WDI Extended using national sources
     Per capita GDP PPP estimation of per capita GDP in each country WDI Extended using WEO database
     Growth of exports Exports yearly change in US dollars  IFS, line 70 Extended using national sources, WDI
     Participating in trade bloc Sum of total GDP in PPP terms of rest of participants in the bloc WDI Definition of well functioning trading blocs
taken from Levy Yeyati, Stein and Daude (2002)
b.- Capacity to repay
     Foreign exchange reserves Total foreign exchange reserves in thousands of US dollars IFS, line 1ld
     Total extenal debt / GDP Public and private external debt divided by GDP WDI
     Short term ext.debt / Reserves External debt due within a year divided by foreign exchange reserves WDI
c.- Macroeconomic variables
     Domestic interest rate Short term money market rate or equivalent IFS, line 60
     Growth Real GDP growth IFS, line 99
     Rate of inflation Yearly change in Consumer Price Index IFS, line 64
     Public sector balance Surplus or deficit as a percentage of GDP IFS, line 80 and line 99 for GDP
d.- Other relevant variables
     Political freedom Civil liberties index from Freedom House Scores,
ranging form 1 (less free) to 7 (more free)
Freedom House ---
     Valuation of investors Moody's sovereign rating, transformed into numbers using
a scale from 1 (C rating) to 23 (Aaa1)
Moody's ---
     Capital controls Dummy taking value of 1 if there exists controls, 0 otherwise Arteta (2002) Completed using IMF's "Exchange rate arrangements
and exchange rate restrictions", assigning value of 1 if there exist controls 
on either capital markets securities, money markets instruments, direct 
investment and liquidation of direct investment
Determing subsamples
a.- Countries with access to markets Dummy taking value of 1 if country have a rating assigned by Moody's. Own elaboration from Moody's ---
b.- Countries with sovereign crises Dummy taking value of 1 if there was a sovereign default Own elaboration from Standard & Poor's (2002) ---
c.- Countries with banking crises crises Dummy taking value of 1 if there exist a systemic or non systemic banking crisis Own elaboration from García Herrero and Del Rio (2002) Lists completed with events pointed out in Bekaert and Harvey's 
"Chronology of important financial, economic
and political events in emerging markets" news database
d.- Countries with exchange rate crises Dummy taking value of 1 if there was a pressure on the exchange rate Own elaboration from Bubula and Otker-Robe (2003) Lists completed with events pointed out in Bekaert and Harvey's 
"Chronology of important financial, economic
and political events in emerging markets" news database
IMF and own elaboration
The list of precautionary arrangements is taken from 
"Adapting precautionary arrangements to crisis prevention", 
prepared by th Policy Development and Review Department 
of the IMF (2003)
Dummy takes value of 1 in a year if an agreement is signed. from January to 
November. If it is signed in December, dummy takes value of 0 in tis year 
and 1 next year.
SBA: Stand-By Agreements; EFF: Extended Fund Facility; PRGF: Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility; SRF: Supplmental Reserve Facility
In the regressions, SRF agreements are considered as SBA or EFF when 
they complement them.
Precautionary arrangements are treated as a different category, as they 
could be both SBA or EFF arrangement
Completed with WDI and national sources
Completed with national sources
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 Table 3: Main statistics of full sample 
  
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
Independent variables
FDI /GDP 3441 2.33 5.31 -82.81 148.66 1.04
Other / GDP 3070 2.63 21.99 -385.77 399.48 2.09
Portfolio / GDP 1300 0.61 2.66 -40.08 39.63 0.08
Total flows / GDP 1273 5.54 22.17 -371.01 260.07 4.59
Objective variables (1)
IMF program 1143 95,35% --- 3,57% 1330,0% 69,1%
     of which SBA 520 77,48% --- 14,53% 1330,0% 54,4%
     of which PRGF 537 98,90% --- 5,00% 220,0% 90,0%
     of which SRF 8 373,38% --- 42,0% 1244,4% 293,9%
     of which EFF 147 188,98% --- 35,0% 662,3% 150,0%
Precautionary arrangements 97 70,49% --- 18,0% 400,0% 40,0%
Regressors
Investment rate 3820 23.04 9.59 1.63 113.58 21.82
Political freedom 3991 4.40 2.05 1 7 5
GDP per capita 3606 3784.19 3820.67 195.49 28255.60 2405.22
Growth 4127 3.54 7.68 -51.03 141.50 3.89
Change in exports 4118 12.54 45.54 -90.43 1483.63 7.80
Capital account restrictions 4190 0.84 0.37 0.00 1.00 1.00
Trade bloc 5073 50048.94 207429.40 0.00 1792227.00 0.00
Public sector balance / GDP 2853 -3.57 6.38 -66.23 68.67 -2.81
Domestic interest rate 2878 70.89 2041.78 0.35 107379.00 8.25
Rating 575 11.33 3.37 2.00 21.00 11.00
External debt / GDP 3415 65.92 87.16 0.00 1598.22 45.37
Short term ext. Debt / Reserves 3065 1281.88 10808.93 0.00 261218.40 69.67
Inflation 3923 57.91 538.61 -58.92 23773.10 8.98
Reserves 3953 2923.75 11478.36 0.01 291128.00 223.04
(1) Rather than the dummy variable of having a program or not, we report
the size of the program, namely the amoung granted as a percentage of the country’s quota.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 56 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0617 
  
Table 4: Correlation matrix  
FDI/GDP PI/GDP OI/GDP Ext.debt Reserves Change Domestic Rating Growth GDP Inflation Public Political Trade Short term Cap.account Investment IMF Total flows
/ GDP in exports interest rate per capita balance freedom bloc debt / reserves restrictions rate program / GDP
FDI/GDP 1,00
PI/GDP 0,12 1,00
OI/GDP 0,03 -0,04 1,00
Ext.debt/GDP -0,04 -0,05 -0,12 1,00
Reserves 0,08 0,13 -0,04 -0,07 1,00
Change in exports 0,02 0,00 0,01 -0,04 -0,01 1,00
Domestic interest rate -0,02 0,00 0,01 0,15 0,00 -0,01 1,00
Rating 0,18 0,14 0,10 -0,37 0,31 0,11 -0,13 1,00
Growth 0,10 0,09 0,05 -0,10 0,04 0,19 -0,06 0,33 1,00
GDP per capita 0,15 0,22 -0,01 -0,21 0,39 -0,03 -0,01 0,59 -0,01 1,00
Inflation -0,02 -0,01 -0,01 0,14 -0,01 -0,02 0,35 -0,18 -0,10 -0,03 1,00
Public sector balance 0,09 -0,02 -0,02 -0,22 0,10 0,08 -0,08 0,36 0,08 0,23 -0,09 1,00
Political freedom -0,13 -0,12 -0,02 0,08 -0,01 0,04 0,00 -0,09 0,01 -0,33 0,02 -0,05 1,00
Trade bloc 0,07 0,04 -0,01 -0,04 0,24 -0,02 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,23 0,01 0,14 -0,16 1,00
Short term debt/reserves -0,05 -0,02 -0,07 0,30 -0,03 -0,03 0,00 -0,07 0,10 -0,05 0,00 -0,08 0,08 -0,03 1,00
Cap.account restrictions -0,06 -0,03 0,00 0,01 -0,05 -0,02 0,01 -0,11 -0,08 -0,21 0,03 -0,09 0,05 -0,09 -0,04 1,00
Investment rate 0,39 0,07 0,10 0,04 0,13 0,01 0,00 0,48 0,20 0,15 -0,04 -0,03 -0,12 0,05 -0,01 -0,08 1,00
IMF program 0,02 -0,05 -0,07 0,22 -0,04 -0,03 -0,01 -0,45 -0,06 -0,15 -0,02 0,03 -0,07 0,09 0,01 0,06 -0,15 1,00
Total flows / GDP 0,27 0,09 0,97 -0,11 0,00 0,03 -0,03 0,13 0,16 0,05 -0,02 -0,01 -0,07 0,01 -0,07 -0,03 0,22 -0,09 1,00  
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 Table 5: Statistics with and without IMF programs/crises 
  
 
Table 6: Distribution of crises and IMF programs 
  
 
5 years 
before first
5 years after 
first
FDI / GDP 2.33 1.76 2.58 2.49 2.26 1.95 3.75 1.10 1.57
Other investment / GDP 2.63 0.41 0.70 0.48 3.67 -0.75 3.69 5.66 0.45
Portfolio investment / GDP 0.61 -0.17 4.03 0.44 0.70 0.33 0.93 0.39 0.49
Total flows / GDP (1) 5.54 1.56 7.44 2.81 7.05 0.44 8.77 11.76 2.52
Investment rate 23.04 20.44 24.14 20.77 23.98 19.54 26.43 22.84 20.76
Political freedom 4.40 4.80 4.85 4.15 4.48 4.13 4.12 4.94 4.33
GDP per capita 3784 3206 4063 2913 4180 2922 6342 2223 2760
Growth 3.54 2.16 4.08 2.81 3.84 2.60 4.62 1.24 2.44
Change in exports 12.54 8.19 14.09 9.93 13.35 7.55 14.09 9.42 11.93
Capital account restrictions 0.84 0.87 0.83 0.87 0.82 0.86 0.57 0.75 0.91
Trade bloc 50049 83939 39202 85870 40308 84293 558081 196592 334426
Public sector balance -3.57 -4.27 -3.26 -3.22 -3.71 -3.23 -2.38 -6.53 -3.90
Domestic interest rate 70.89 198.58 12.23 31.85 91.36 48.30 9.68 370.04 62.17
Rating 11.33 9.72 12.02 9.38 12.52 8.45 13.63 11.20 10.17
External debt / GDP 65.92 98.97 50.30 93.89 53.20 102.46 33.55 65.92 87.30
Short term ext.debt / Reserves 1281.9 3204.0 301.9 1360.5 1240.8 2054.8 95.67 798.6 744.6
Inflation rate 57.91 129.36 28.72 36.17 65.79 49.19 28.24 186.77 55.52
Reserves 2924 3182 2823 2286 3177 2337 3678 894 1342
Countries with at least one 
program
Whole 
Sample
IMF 
program
Crisis + 
IMF 
program
Countries that never 
had a programCrisis No crisis
No IMF 
program
Number of observations with an IMF program: percentage of total
SBA EFF PRGF SRF
Total 
programs Precautionary
During crises   56.5 42.2 48.4 75.0 51.4 34.0
     Sovereign   42.9 32.0 37.8 37.5 39.0 13.4
     Banking   20.2 10.9 13.0 62.5 16.5 20.6
     Exchange rate   6.7 6.1 6.1 37.5 6.8 6.2
Without crises   43.5 57.8 51.6 25.0 48.6 66.0
Total observations   520 147 537 8 1143 97
Memo: information about types of crises: percentage of total and coincidence of crises
% total crises Observations
Sovereign 72.9     Sovereign and banking 109
Banking 29.3     Sovereign and exchange rate  56
Exchange Rate  13.6     Banking and exchange rate  44
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APPENDIX 3: 
Table 1: Country classification to choose case studies 
 
Deciles Average per capita GDP 1/ 2/ 
 
Investment Rate 2/ 
 
1st 
Antigua, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Cyprus, 
Ecuador, Gabon, Hong Kong, Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapur, Uruguay 
Algeria, Bahrain, Botswana, Bulgaria, Buthan, Gabon, Kiribati, 
Latvia, Romania, Russia, Singapore, St Kitts & Nevis, 
Turkmenistan 
2d Brazil, Estonia, Hungary, Korea, Malta, Oman, Panama, Russia, Seychelles, Slovak, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela 
Albania, Antigua, Congo, Cyprus, Dominica, Estonia, Hungary, 
Kirguistan, Poland, Slovak, Solomon,Tajikistan 
3d 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Fidji, Jamaica, Latvia, Malaysia, 
Mauricius, Mexico, Namibia, Peru, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, 
Turkmenistan 
Comoros, Georgia, Grenada, Jordan, Lesotho, Seychelles, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, 
Venezuela, Ukraine 
4th Algeria, Belize, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Dominica, Grenada, Iran, Jordan, Kazakstan, Lebanon, Moldova, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine 
Cape Verde, Egypt, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Hong-Kong, Korea, 
Malaysia, Malta, Oman, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Tonga, 
Tunisia 
5th 
Botswana, Djibuti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Georgia, 
Guatemala, Paraguay, St Vincent & the Grenadines, Tajikistan, 
Thailand, Tonga, Tunisia, Vanuatu 
Costa Rica, Fidji, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Lybia, Mauricius, 
Mauritania, Morrocco, Papua, Phillipines, Somalia, Syria, Togo 
6th 
Bolivia, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cote d`Ivoire, Haiti, Kirguistan, 
Kiribati, Morrocco, Phillipines, Senegal, Solomon, Syria, 
Uzbekistan, Zambia, Zimbabwe  
Argentina, Belize, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Fidji, Jamaica, Kenya, Malawi, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Zambia 
7th 
Angola, Cameroon, Comoros, Egypt, Haiti, Honduras, Kirguistan, 
Nicaragua, Senegal, Solomon, Syria, Uzbekistan, Zambia 
Zimambwe 
Barbados, Brazil, Burkina Fasso, Chile, Colombia, Cote d`Ivoire, 
Gambia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka 
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 Deciles Average per capita GDP 1/ 2/ 
 
Investment Rate 2/ 
 
8th 
Benin, Central African Rep., Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Indonesia, Mauritania, Mongolia, Sao Tome, Sierra Leona, 
Sri Lanka, Togo  
Bahamas, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, India, Kuwait, 
Mali, Namibia, Pakistan, Panama, Turkey, Uruguay, Zimbabwe 
9th Bangladesh, Bhutan, Congo, India, Kenia, Laos, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda 
Angola, Benin, Bolivia, Congo, Guatemala, Haiti, Myanmar, Nepal, 
Niger, Rwanda, Sudan, Vietnam 
10th 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, China, Ethiopia, Guinea-
Bissau, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Vietnam 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African 
Rep., Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Laos, Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Sao Tome, Senegal, Sierra Leona, Uganda 
1/ In constant 1995 USD 
2/ Averages for the period 1970-2002 
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The Brazilian crisis 
In 1998 and 1999 Brazil underwent a financial crisis as a result of both  external and 
domestic factors. On the external side Brazil suffered a contagion from the Russian 
crisis, and was affected by the distress facing Long Term Capital Management in the 
United States. On the domestic side the adoption of the Real Plan in 1994 had various 
side effects, such as an appreciating currency and the indexation of fiscal expenditures 
without hardly any indexation of revenues. These led to the widening of fiscal and 
current account deficits, which international investors started to perceive as an 
important weakness in the midst of the Asian crisis. A tightening in monetary policy and 
the announcement of a fiscal package to address the growing imbalances restored 
confidence relatively fast until the Russian crisis erupted. The authorities attempted to 
limit capital outflows with a further tightening of monetary policy but without much 
success. Brazil was, thus, forced to call in the IMF for assistance. 
 
During the negotiations of the December 1998 program, the most controversial issues 
were the extent of the overvaluation of the Real and whether to maintain or not the 
crawling peg. Ultimately, the exchange rate regime was kept unchanged and the 
program conditionality focused mainly on regaining control on public finances. The 
rescue package included US$ 42 billion from the World Bank, the IDB, and bilateral 
creditors and combined an orthodox adjustment with structural reforms to curb fiscal 
spending. Notwithstanding the relatively large package with IMF financial support 
equivalent to about 730% of quota, the program failed to restore market confidence. 
There were two main reasons for this: the strong congressional opposition to the 
implementation of IMF conditionality and the unsustainability of the crawling peg, given 
the large and growing real exchange rate appreciation. The trigger of the collapse of the 
Real was the announcement by the governor of Minas Gerais of a moratorium of 90 
days on state debt repayments. This introduced unsustainable pressures on the Real, 
forcing the authorities to abandon the peg in January 1999 and to further tighten 
monetary policy in order to avoid an excessive devaluation of the currency. 
 
These events led to a reconsideration of the program, so that several changes were 
introduced in March. The most significant one was the introduction of an inflation target 
mechanism to guide monetary policy in the new floating exchange rate regime. Fiscal 
conditionality was substantially reinforced, with a review of both the fiscal adjustment 
and the structural fiscal reforms contemplated in the original program. Additionally, 
private sector involvement was requested from international commercial banks, which 
were asked to maintain their inter-bank credit lines for at least six months.  This second 
package managed to stabilize the exchange rate and to restore market confidence, and 
Brazil began to recover from the crisis faster than expected, partly thanks to a 
substantial resumption of FDI flows. In 1999, in contrast to the projected decline of 
3.8%, GDP grew by 0.8%, and in 2000 GDP grew by 4.4%.  
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 Table 2: 
Policy Response to the crisis in Brazil22 23 
                                            
22 Original programme in December 02, 1998 (t-1). Reviewed programme in March 30, 1999 (t) 
23  SRF expired in t+3. SBA expired in t+12. 
    t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 
Exchange rate 
policies 
 Crawling peg 
maintained 
 Crawling peg 
dropped (Jan. 99). 
Free float adopted. 
Flexible exchange rate regime 
Monetary policy 
Monetary policy 
aimed at sustaining 
the peg 
Adoption of an 
inflation-targeting 
framework. (March 
99 program 
review)  
 Monetary policy 
relaxed as inflation 
remains under 
control 
 Gradual relaxation of monetary policy. The introduction of an inflation target system 
considered as one of the major successes of the reviewed programme. 
Macroeconomic 
policies 
Fiscal policy 
 Fiscal adjustment 
announced (Obj: 
primary surplus of 
2.6%) 
Reinforcement of 
fiscal adjustment in 
March 99 review. 
(Obj: 3.1% GDP 
primary surplus in 
1999, 3.25% in 
2000 and 3.35% in 
2001)  
 Primary surplus targets met 
 Commitment to 
pass a fiscal 
responsibility law 
Preparation of 
law’s draft  
Draft of fiscal 
responsibility law 
submitted to 
Congress  
Negotiation of the Fiscal Responsibility law in Congress 
Fiscal responsibility 
law passed.  
  
 Social security and 
pension reform 
 Limited progress Halted progress. Congressional opposition 
Fiscal measures 
 Structural tax 
reform 
 Limited progress because of congressional opposition 
Financial and 
corporate sector 
measures 
Improvements in 
financial sector 
regulation 
 Limited progress 
Structural 
reforms  
Liberalization 
measures 
 Labor market 
reform 
 Limited progress 
Other Private Sector Involvement 
 Limited voluntary 
PSI considered in 
the program 
Renewed efforts for 
promoting 
voluntary PSI 
among major 
creditor banks.  
Limited promotion 
of voluntary PSI.  
None 
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 The Korean crisis 
After several years of impressive economic performance, in 1998 the South Korean 
economy suffered a severe financial crisis which came as a surprise to most 
international observers. The moral hazard problem stemming from an implicit 
government safety net for financial institutions and the lack of strong supervision had 
resulted in complex networks of connected lending, a deterioration in the quality of 
investment and a build-up of non-performing loans. Additionally, certain shortcomings in 
the design of the financial liberalization process favoured external short-term borrowing, 
resulting in substantial maturity and currency mismatches.  
 
As international investors begun to reduce their exposure to the region after the Thai 
crisis and the collapse of the Hong Kong stock exchange, the Korean won was put 
under pressure, making it difficult for Korean banks and corporations to roll-over 
existing debts and to obtain fresh loans. The authorities initially responded with 
interventions in support of the won which were ineffective and led to a gradual depletion 
of official reserves, setting the stage for a speculative attack on the won. Monetary 
policy was briefly contracted, increasing the difficulties that the corporate and financial 
sectors were facing. This policy mix did not succeed, and by October 1997 speculative 
pressures became unsustainable. In November the authorities were forced to stop 
supporting the won, and requested an IMF program to cope with the financial crisis.  
 
In December 4, 1997, a rescue package was put forward, consisting of a substantially 
front loaded three year SBA, amounting to US$ 21 billion approved under the 
exceptional emergency financing mechanism. This was complemented by US$ 14 
billion provided by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and by a second 
line of defence amounting to US$ 20 billion provided by bilateral donors. The 
conditionality attached to this package consisted mainly of a tightening of monetary and 
fiscal policy, and an ambitious program of structural reforms aimed at restructuring the 
financial sector, and at improving corporate governance. However, this rescue package 
did not succeed in restoring market confidence. A first reason was the uncertainty that 
resulted from the presidential elections regarding the new government’s commitment to 
the IMF program. A second one was the press dissemination of information about the 
very low stock of usable reserves, which reinforced speculative pressures on the won. 
Third, monetary and fiscal conditionality was considered too contractive for the 
country’s circumstances. Fourth, the program itself was considered too small when it 
became clear that the second line of defence would not be really made available. In 
fact, it has been argued that by including a second line of defence the real extent of the 
financial gap required to rescue Korea was revealed. 
 
After the explicit support of the new government to the IMF policy prescriptions, the 
rescue strategy was redesigned by including private sector involvement. In fact, in 
December 24, a group of major international banks agreed to rollover interbank debt. 
Although in 1998 the Korean economy contracted by almost 6% the effect of the crisis 
was shorter than expected, and in 1999 economic growth resumed at a spectacular 
rate: 10.9%. The program conditionality was met throughout the process.  
 
 
 
          BANCO DE ESPAÑA     63 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0617 
 Table 3: 
Policy Response to the crisis in Korea24 25 
    t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 
Exchange rate 
policies 
Adoption of a 
managed float.  
 Central bank 
support to the won.
 Relaxation of 
support to the won. 
Further relaxation of support to the won.  
Monetary Policy 
Tight Monetary 
policy: overnight 
rate increased from 
12.7% to 25%, and 
to 34%. 
Tight monetary 
policy: overnight call 
rates maintained at  
20- 25%. 
Substantial relaxation of monetary policy.   Moderate relaxation of monetary policy 
Interest rates 
stabilized at around 
5%.  
Macroeconomic 
policies 
Fiscal Policy 
Commitment to a 
small fiscal surplus: 
1% of GDP in 1998.
 Automatic 
stabilizers let to 
work. 
Expansionary fiscal policy.  
 Budget deficit of 
4% of GDP in 
1998. 
Return to a more neutral  fiscal policy 
Fiscal measures None 
Financial sector 
restructuring: 
closure of non 
viable banks, 
restructuring and 
recapitalization 
plans for viable 
institutions. 
 6 commercial 
banks and 16 
merchant banks 
closed / merged. 
Govnt. takes control 
of  2 large banks  
Closure of unviable 
banks continues. 
Reluctance to close 
major banks. 
Legislation passed 
to write down 
equity of failed 
banks. 
  
Despite some 
delays in 
implementation, 
government 
commitment to 
restructuring. 
Reinforcement of 
the regulatory and 
supervisory 
framework. 
Independence 
granted to central 
bank. Supervisory 
single agency 
created. 
Introduction of new 
provisioning and 
loan classification 
regulations.   
  
  
Introduction of rules 
for stronger risk 
management in 
forex operations. 
 
Financial and 
corporate sector 
measures 
Corporate sector reform: new accounting 
and disclosure standards, new bankruptcy 
procedure 
Strong initial 
commitment to 
corporate sector 
reforms 
Corporate sector reform gradually delayed in parallel with economic stabilization. 
Trade liberalization Limited progress 
Structural reforms 
Liberalization 
measures Market labour 
liberalization 
Lay-offs agreed by 
unions. 
None 
Other Private Sector Involvement 
Coordinated debt 
rollover agreement. 
  
Korean short term 
debt rescheduled. 
Maturities extended.
None 
 
                                            
24 Original programme in December 04, 1998 (t). Reviewed programme in December 24, 1998 (t) 
25 SRF expired in t+4. SBA expired in t+12. 
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 The Malaysian crisis 
As in Korea, in Malaysia the main source of vulnerability was the weakness of the 
domestic financial sector, with a large stock of bad loans fuelled by the government’s 
lax regulations on collateral based loans, by the burst of a stock exchange bubble, and 
by various economic policies aimed at benefiting certain ethnic groups. Malaysia was 
also very exposed to speculation due to the importance of ringgit off-shore operations 
in Singapore. As a response to the balance of payment pressures interest rates were 
raised, government spending was cut, and the authorities expressed their commitment 
to a more flexible exchange rate regime. This orthodox policy mix, however, did not 
succeed in stabilizing the situation. 
 
The introduction of various fiscal stimuli, together with a relaxation of monetary policy 
around the summer of 1998 marked the beginning of Malaysia’s departure from 
orthodoxy in crisis resolution. These measures, however, failed to reactivate the 
economy because the liquidity that the authorities were pumping into the system was 
leaking abroad as a result of the continued speculation against the currency. In order to 
tackle this problem, the authorities introduced capital controls in September, making all 
offshore ringgit transactions illegal forcing to repatriate ringgits held abroad, pegging the 
exchange rate, reducing interest rates substantially, announcing an expansionary 
budget, bailing out troubled firms and urging domestic banks to resume their lending. 
Various measures were also implemented to restructure the financial and corporate 
sector through the establishment of an asset management company (Danaharta) and a 
vehicle company to recapitalize banks (Danamodal). In the last quarter of 1998 the 
Malaysian economy started to display some signs of recovery, and by 1999 its GDP 
recorded a growth rate of 4.7%. After 1999 Malaysia has moved back towards financial 
liberalization as capital controls have been gradually dismantled.  
 
One of the most vividly discussed issues in the aftermath of the Asian crisis has been 
whether the Malaysian response was more successful than the others in mitigating the 
impact of the crisis, i.e. whether there was an alternative path to the IMF rescue 
packages. On the one hand, it has been argued that capital controls were fairly 
successful in segmenting Malaysian capital markets from international financial markets, 
and in curtailing speculation and offshore trading in ringgits, enabling the authorities to 
maintain and stabilize a fixed exchange rate, and to gain control over the monetary 
policy. On the other hand, there is less evidence on whether the successful 
implementation of capital controls led to a faster or less costly recovery from the crisis. 
It has been argued that Malaysia returned to a growth path thanks to exogenous factors 
such as the stabilization of regional financial markets, and the 75 basis points cut of the 
Federal Reserve interest rate. Others have argued that Malaysia’s situation was less 
vulnerable than that of the other Asian Tigers, and that, accordingly, its crisis should 
have been less damaging and the recovery faster. Finally, some have suggested that 
the Malaysian policy mix might have jeopardized future growth by allowing inefficient 
firms to survive through the bailouts, and by having permanently reduced the willingness 
of international investors to invest in Malaysia. 
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 Table 4: Policy Responses to the crisis in Malaysia 
   t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 
Exchange rate 
policies Ringgit on a depreciating trend since June 97 
Pegging of the 
ringgit (Sept.) 
Pegged exchange rate 
Monetary policy Monetary policy tightened to counter inflationary 
consequences of the depreciation of  ringgit 
Monetary policy 
eased in July and 
Sept after  
introducing capital 
controls. 
Further easing of monetary policy Macroeconomic 
policies 
Fiscal policy 
The fiscal budget 
surplus projection 
for 1998 is revised 
downward. 
First fiscal stimulus (March) 
Second fiscal 
stimulus (July) 
1998 fiscal deficit:  
1,5% GDP. First 
deficit registered 
since 1991. 
Fiscal stimulus for 1999. Federal deficit 
projection of 5.5% of GDP 
Fiscal measures None 
Beginning of a limited effort to consolidate the finance 
company sector 
Creation of public 
asset management 
companies 
recapitalize banks  
Banksordered to sell non performing loans at market value to 
public asset management companies 
  
Introduction of new 
rules for risk 
management in 
banks. Loan 
classification and 
provision 
requirements 
tightened. 
Changes in public 
disclosure 
requirements for 
banks 
None 
Financial and 
Corporate Sector 
measures 
  
Establishment of committee to design a 
new framework for corporate 
governance 
Companies Act is 
reviewed to 
strengthen 
corporate 
governance 
  
Disclosure 
requirements 
enhanced 
  
Structural reforms 
Liberalization 
measures None 
Measures passed 
to increase labour 
market flexibility 
None 
Other Capital controls None Introduction of capital controls  Introduction of the exit levy system 
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 The Colombian crisis 
The twin Colombian crises were caused by a combination of external and domestic 
factors. On the external side, Colombia underwent a terms of trade deterioration and 
the emergence of a substantial current account deficit (5.7% of GDP) in the second half 
of the 90’s, together with a progressive deterioration of financing conditions as a result 
of continued political uncertainty and instability in emerging markets. On the domestic 
side, the economy displayed various macroeconomic imbalances such as a large and 
rising budget deficit (primary deficit of 4.3% of GDP in 1997) and a marked increase in 
domestic and external debt. The fiscal problem was primarily a result of the Colombian 
decentralization process and the system of revenue transfers to territorial governments. 
Additionally, the financial sector was weak due to the economic slowdown, the 
undercapitalization of several banks, an inadequate framework for supervision, a 
reduction in intermediation margins, and important maturities and currency mismatches.  
 
These factors contributed to unsettle international investors, and in 1998 Colombia 
experienced a reversal of the substantial volume of capital inflows that the country had 
been attracting until 1997. The reversal of capital flows introduced downward pressures 
on the Peso, forcing the authorities to tighten monetary policy, and to depreciate the 
currency in September 1998 and in June 1999. As the Central Bank raised interest 
rates to defend the Peso, the situation of financial intermediaries further deteriorated. 
Unproductive assets in the financial system increased from slightly over 3% in 1997 to 
almost 8% in 1999, profits and solvency collapsed and the sector registered a dramatic 
fall in its net worth (Arias, 2002). The original policy mix was unsuccessful in restoring 
market confidence, and in September 1999 the authorities were forced to float the 
Peso, abandoning the target zone regime that had been in place since 1994. The 
floating of the Peso was backed with measures to curb fiscal spending and the 
implementation of various structural reforms, especially in the financial sector. This 
policy mix was more successful in restoring market confidence. By year 2000 the 
Colombian economy was out of the recession, and the Peso was experiencing a 
moderate appreciation. Nevertheless, the performance of the Colombian economy in 
recent years has been rather disappointing, partly due to the fact that it is still struggling 
to overcome some of the sources of vulnerability that led to the crisis, especially in the 
financial sector. 
  
The policy mix implemented by the Colombian authorities was backed by an IMF 
Extended Fund Facility approved in December 1999. However, Colombia was not 
included in the sub-sample of countries with an IMF program for three reasons. First, 
the Fund facility was approved almost two years after the beginning of the crisis. By 
then the Peso had been floated and was registering a moderate appreciation. Second, 
the funds committed by the IMF were never disbursed, which, together with the timing 
of the program, suggests that it was a crisis prevention tool rather than a crisis 
resolution tool. Third, the adoption of an IMF program did not imply a substantial 
realignment in the Colombian policies and, in contrast with the Malaysian case, 
Colombia did never depart from orthodoxy in order to cope with the crises.  
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Table 5: Policy Response to the crisis in Colombia 
    t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 
Exchange rate 
policies 
Exchange rate band 
depreciated 
Depretiation pressures continue. 
Exchange rate band 
widened and 
depreciated (June) 
The peso allowed to 
float (Sept.) 
Moderate appreciation of the peso 
Monetary policy Monetary policy tightened as a result of 
pressures on the peso 
Gradual relaxation of monetary policy 
Macroeconomic  
policies 
Fiscal policy 
Contractionary fiscal 
package including 
spending cuts and 
rise in fuel tax 
Fiscal package 
does not reduce 
fiscal deficit due to 
recession and  
revenue sharing 
agreements. 
Deterioration of fiscal situation 
New fiscal package 
approved. 
Wage freeze for 
government 
employees 
Failure of the fiscal 
contraction. 
Fiscal measures 
Widening of VAT tax 
base and 
strengthening of tax 
enforcement as part 
of the fiscal 
package. 
None 
Reform of the 
revenue sharing 
system passed. 
Limited reform of 
the pension system.
The tax system that results from the 
various reforms considered complex and 
distortionary 
Financial and 
Corporate sector 
measures 
  
Program to 
recapitalize viable 
banks and to deal 
with public banks. 
The government 
begins to close 
unviable banks and 
to take over 
troubled banks. 
Financial sector 
reform law passed. 
Strengthening of the 
banking supervisor. 
Banks 
recapitalization plan 
reinforced. Financed 
by a public agency 
Final debt relief 
package for 
mortgage owners 
passed. 
  
Structural 
reforms  
Liberalization 
measures None 
Other IMF No IMF programme in place. Colombian economic policies, however, broadly in line with IMF 
recommendations 
EFF programme approved as part of an 
economic recovery plan. 
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Table 6: Major policies implemented in Argentina26 
    t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 
Exchange rate 
policies Currency board 
Monetary policy No sovereignty on monetary policy 
Macroeconomic 
policies 
Fiscal policy 
Shortfalls in  
government 
revenues tend to 
increase budget 
deficit 
Federal government 
deficit: 1.3% of 
GDP. Provincial 
government deficit: 
0.8% of GDP 
The government 
compensates the 
revenue shortfall 
and meets all the 
IMF's program 
performance 
criteria. 
Deterioration of public finances. Setting of 
adverse dynamics in public debt 
Federal deficit: 
2.5% of GDP. 
Provincial deficit: 
1.3% of GDP 
Further 
deterioration of 
public finances. 
Fiscal measures   
Approval of a Tax 
Reform aimed at 
improving efficiency 
and equity and at 
promoting the 
competitiveness of 
the economy 
New tax legislation 
removing a prior 
bias in favour of 
debt financing 
  
Fiscal Convertibility 
Law passed: 
increase in personal 
income and wealth 
tax, widening of 
VAT, effort at 
improving tax 
compliance. Fiscal 
Responsibility Law 
passed. 
A Federal 
Commitment  
reached to 
constrain provincial 
expenditures 
  
Financial and 
Corporate sector 
measures 
None 
Structural reforms 
Liberalization 
measures   
Measures to 
increase labour 
flexibility in small 
and medium 
enterprises 
Progress in 
privatization: the 
government sells its 
stakes in the former 
state oil company. 
None  
Other     
Unrest among international investors after comments in favour of 
a moratorium on foreign debt payments from the part of 
presidential candidates 
Presidential 
elections 
IMF approves US$ 
7.2 billion 
precautionary 3 
year SBA 
arrangement 
 
                                            
26 The original programme due to expire in t+12. However, new 17-months SBA signed in t+4. 
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Table 7: Major policies implemented in Chile 
    t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 
Exchange rate 
policies 
Pre-announced 
crawling band to 
USD widened from 
+/-2.75% to  +/- 
3.5%. Central Bank 
intervenes to avoid 
depreciation  
Pre-announced 
crawling band to 
US dollar widened 
from +/-3.5% to +/- 
8% 
Pre-announced crawling band: +/- 8% 
Adoption of a free 
floating regime 
De facto managed floating 
Monetary policy 
Sharp tightening of 
monetary policy. 
Interest rates raised 
from 8.5% to 14% 
Relaxation of 
monetary policy 
(interest rates fall 
from 14% to 7.8%) 
Interest rates fall 
from 7.8% to 7% 
Interest rates fall 
from 7% to 5% 
Full adoption of 
inflation targeting   
Monetary rule: 
inflation in a 2-4 
percent range 
Interest rates unchanged 
Macroeconomic 
policies 
Fiscal policy Prudent fiscal policy Easing of fiscal 
policy 
Introduction of a 
fiscal stimulus 
package 
Expansionary fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy 
tightened 
Fiscal measures None 
Financial and 
Corporate 
measures 
None 
Structural reforms 
Liberalization 
measures None 
Unilateral reduction 
of uniform external 
tariff by 1 
percentage point 
Continuation of the privatization 
programme 
  
3  water companies 
privatized, 4 
seaports and 
various road 
concessions 
granted in 1999 
Unilateral reduction 
of uniform external 
tariff by 1 
percentage point 
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Table 8: Major policies implemented in Mexico 
    t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 
Exchange rate 
policies Managed floating regime. 
Interventions of the 
bank of Mexico to 
offset appreciation of 
the peso 
Managed Floating Regime 
Monetary policy Tight monetary policy 
Monetary policy 
objective for 1999: to 
bring inflation below 
13 percent. 
Tightening of 
monetary policy 
following the Brazilian 
crisis 
Tight monetary policy 
Inflation 
objective for 
1999 met. 
Monetary 
policy eased 
Monetary policy 
objective for 2000: 
to bring inflation 
below 10 percent Macroeconomic 
policies 
Fiscal policy Contractionary fiscal policy to compensate the effects of external 
shocks and the fall in oil prices 
Financial 
strengthening 
program for 
1999-2001 to 
ensure 
refinancing of 
Mexican public 
debt 
  
1999 fiscal 
targets met 
  
Fiscal measures None 
Financial and 
Corporate sector 
measures 
  
  
New banking 
legislation. Increased 
transparency to 
restructure banks. 
Creation of new 
agency to manage 
the deposit insurance 
and liabilities of the 
restructuring  
  
Various legal 
initiatives to 
protect 
debtors and 
creditors and 
to introduce a 
new corporate 
bankruptcy 
law 
Improvements in 
regulatory 
framework Structural reforms 
Liberalization 
measures   
Removal of all limits of foreign 
investment in Mexican banks 
None 
Other actions IMF No IMF programme in place. Policies broadly in line with IMF 
recommendations. 
IMF approves US$ 4.234 billion 
17 months SBA arrangement 
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Table 9: Major policies implemented in Peru27 
    t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 
Exchange rate 
policies 
De jure flexible exchange rate regime. De facto crawling +/- 2% 
band aroud the US dollar 
De jure flexible exchange rate regime. De facto peg to the US dollar 
Monetary policy 
Prudent monetary policy. Limited impact 
of the Peruvian monetary policy in the 
context of a highly dolarized economy 
Inflation target range for 1999: 5 - 6 percent 
Inflation in 1999: 
3.7 percent 
Inflation target 
range at the end of 
2000: 3.5 - 4 
percent 
Macroeconomic 
policies 
Fiscal policy Tight fiscal policy Fiscal policy begins 
to be eased 
Fiscal policy eased: reduction in the 
primary surplus projections for 1999 
Fall in tax collection 
leads to an 
expansion of the 
fiscal deficit 
1999 fiscal deficit: 
3% of GDP 
Expansionary fiscal 
policy 
Fiscal measures None 
Fiscal responsibility 
and transparency 
law setting limits for 
deficit, government 
expenditure and 
public debt 
  
Financial and 
Corporate sector 
measures 
None 
Bank reform 
strengthens 
supervision, 
increases efficiency 
of liquidation 
procedures and 
improves 
coordination among 
regulators 
None 
Structural reforms 
Liberalization 
measures None 
Agricultural land 
securitizing 
Postponement of 
various privatization 
projects. 
  Bidding on gas 
extraction  
Other    
Peace agreement 
reached with 
Ecuador 
Peru graduates 
from Paris club 
rescheduling 
  
New precautionary 
arrangement with 
the IMF (3 year EFF, 
US$ 512 million) 
  
The IMF 
performance criteria 
for December 1999 
are not met 
  
 
                                            
27 Precautionary programme expiration in t+12. 
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